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The purpose of this study is to investigate the Hong Kong
foreign exchange market. The main hypothesis for this thesis
is that the Hong Kong foreign exchange market is efficient.
More specifically, we investigate the following three pro-
positions:
(1) the market environment is consistent with the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH),
(2) the behavior of market participants (interest
arbitragers and speculators) is consistent with the EMI, and
(3) market prices fully reflect all available information
for the market.
To examine proposition one, we have conducted in-depth
interviews with five leading banks and one broker firm to explore
the market environment. We find that information flows smoothly
in the market and hence the market works efficiently. Pro-
position two and three are tested with respect to the Hong Kong
dollar exchange ratesvs U.S. dollar and vs British pound from
January 1979 to June 1982. In order to test proposition two
operationally, the Covered Interest Rate Parity (CIRP) hypothesis,
which reflects the behavior of interest arbitragers and
speculators in the market, is tested. The CIRP works well
for the British pound and has poor performance for the U.S.
dollar. However, it seems that there is not any unexploited
profit opportunity in the covered interest arbitrages. There-
fore. the empirical evidences are consistent with proposition
3two. Finally, we investigate proposition three by means of the
weak-form EMH tests and examination on the property of forecasts
of future spot rates produced by the three market-based fore-
casting models, namely, the lagged spot model, the Fisher parity
model and the forward rate model. We have found that the empirical
results support the proposition that all available information
is almostly reflected by market prices. And, all market fore-
casts are unbiased predictors for future spot rates and their
forecast errors are unpredictable. In other words, proposition
three cannot be rejected.
On the whole, our empirical evidences are consistent with
the hypothesis that the Hong Kong foreign exchange market is
efficient. This indicates that no one can earn extra profit
by any sophisticated technique to forecast future spot rates.
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Along with the rapid development of the Hong Kong economy
during the last decade, the financial sector has also experienced
substantial growth. This may be reflected by the fact that the
contribution of this sector to GDP rose from 17.2% in 1973 to
25.9% in 1980.2 Obviously, this sector plays a vital role in the
economy and its importance has been increasing. Indeed, it has
been found that the domestic economic growth for the past three
years is due to domestic demand and activity of tertiary services
sectors. 3 Externally, Hong Kong has established its status as a
major regional and international financial centre. It mainly
provides expertise and channels funds to the Asia-Pacific region.
Therefore, the Hong Kong's financial growth has significant
economic implications, and it is necessary to explore the working
of the 'financial sector.
In the past, this area did not receive much concern.
'The average real growth rate of GDP in Hong Kong is about
9.6% for the period 1973-1982.
`The figures include the income due to the real estate
industry and hence may exaggerate the situation. However, a few
studies believe that banking accounting for 20% of Hong Kong's
GDP is a moderate estimate. For example, see Wells (1981), p. 117
31983 Economic Prospects, Para. 2.6, Hong Kong Government
Printer.
2
Recently, the attention paid to this area has been increasing.
Few researches have been done on the financial sector as well as
on each individual financial market, whether it is for the aspects
of structure or behavior.' While the role of the Hong Kong
foreign exchange (FX) market has become more important, it is
surprising that studies on the market are seldomly found.5
Undoubtedly, the market is of great importance to the economy. 6
Hence, it is time that a rigorous study on the behavior of the
market should be carried out. The purpose of our study is to
fill this gap and to examine the behavior of the Hong Kong FX
market.
Obviously, the scope for the behavior of the Hong Kong FX
market is too broad for us to investigate. Naturally, we have
to narrow our discussion to certain area. However, we still
take into consideration that we would not suffer from loss of
generality. As a comprehensive study, it must, at least, consist
of institutional and theoretical considerations on the subject
matter. Therefore, the study is organized in this direction.
Thus, we would like to depict the market's behavior from the
view point of market efficiency. In other words, the main
hypothesis in this study is that the Hong Kong FX market is
efficient. In order to test this hypothesis empirically, we
4 For an analysis on the structure of financial sector in
Hong Kong, see Lee and Jao (1982), Ho (1982b), and Li (1979).
For researches on the role of the money supply, see Chou (1980),
Ho (1982a, 1983), Kwong (1982) and Lin (1971). For studies on
the stock market. see Law (1982.
5 Leung (1983) and Chow (1983) have investigated the deter-
minant of the exchange rates of Hong Kong dollar.
This point will be elaborated in greater detail in
Section 3.3.1 of Chapter III.
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shall examine the following three more specific propositions :
( 1 ) the market environmentis consistentwith the Efficient
Market Hypothesis( EMH ) ,
( 2 ) the behavior of market participants( speculatorsand
arbitragers) is consistentwith the EMH , and
( 3 ) market prices fully reflect all available information
for the market.
If these three propositionscannot be rejected , we will not reject
the hypothesisthat the Hong Kong FX market is efficient .
Proposition one considers whether the institutional and
operational aspects of the market can provide a necessary and
sufficient condition for the market to work efficiently or not .
Hence , a comprehensiveinvestigation on the institutional and
operationalaspects of the market has to be conducted. By doing
this , we are able to reject or accept the first proposition.
Proposition two takes into account the relationship between
interest arbitragers and speculators , which is reflected by the
Covered Interest Rate Parity ( CIRP ) hypothesis. Based on the
empirical results on the CIRP hypothesis, we may reject or accept
the propositionthat the market participants' behavior is con -
sistent with the EMH ( i . e . there is not any profit opportunity
which should be exploited by arbitragers and speculators in the
market ) . The last proposition- - market prices fully reflect
all available informationsuch that no one can earn extra profit
- - will be examinedby meansof the weak - form ENI in Fama ' s ( 1970 )
sense and the property of the market forecasts . If the empirical
evidences are consistent with the EMH , we cannot reject proposition
three.
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Based on the empirical study on the three specific pro -
positions , the framework of presentationfor the thesis is
therefore formulated .
Here we would like to give an overviewon this thesis .
A review on the relevant literatures concerning the relationship
between exchange rates and interest rates , market efficiency ,
and foreign exchange forecasting approaches are given in
Chapter II . Chapter III builds the institutional framework for
the market and examines propositionone . In order to achieve
this objective , we have conductedin - depth interviewswith
five leading banks and a broker firm . The salient features of
the institutions are described and factors that would violate
the validity of the theoretical assumptionsof theory are also
identified. In Chapter IV , the empirical test on the CIRP
hypothesis will be conducted and hence proposition two is examined .
Furthermore , we investigate an additional hypothesis derived from
the CIRP , that is , the arbitragemargin should not be , on the
average , significantlydifferent from zero . The third pro -
positionis examinedby Chapter V and VI . The weak - form EMH
for the market are examinedin Chapter V . The concept of market
efficiencyis due to Fama ( 1970 ) . Generally, most of the tests
on the EMH are weak - form tests . Semi - strong - form and strong -
form test are seldomly carried out because of data availability .
Further , we will also conduct weak - form tests to investigatethe
EMH in the Hong Kong FX market . The three forecastingmodels ,
namely, the Fisher Parity Model ( FPM ) , the LaggedSpot Model ( LSM )
and the ForwardRate Model ( FRM ) as well as the nature of their
forecasts are examined in Chapter VI . In addition , some general
5
descriptive statistics are given to depict the behavior of the
U . S . Dollar ( USD ) and the BritishPound( BP ) over time during
the sample period . Finally , some concludingremarks are given
in ChapterVII .
Before we leave this chapter , a word about the data used
and some important findings in our empirical studies are given
here . We mainly examine the behavior of two currencies, namely ,
the USD and the BP . 7 The data source is presentedin AppendixIII .
The sample mainly covers the period from January 1979 to June
1982 . 8 It is found that the size of the market is about that of
the Singapore market . The market turnover estimated for a
moderateactive working day is US $ 10 billion in 1982 . Deutsche
Mark ( DM ) , JapaneseYen ( JY ) , Hong Kong Dollar ( HKD ) , British
Pound ( BP ) , and Swiss Franc ( SF ) are the most active trading
currencies. 9 The most active market participantsare , in general ,
foreign banks and a few local leading banks . And , it is found
that the institutional and operational aspects of the market
allow the market to work efficiently . With regard to the CIRP
hypothesis, it is not rejected for the BP and is rejected for
the USD . Further , there is not any unexploitedprofit opportunity
for the covered interest arbitrages. In addition , the market is
found to be efficient . What is more interestingis that the
LSM outperformsthe other two models , The forecasts due to the
7 These two currenciesare selected because ( 1 ) they are two
of the most active currenciestraded in the Hong Kong FX market ,
and ( 2 ) availabilityof data .
8 However , the sample period for each chapter may vary
because of data limitations.
9 All the currenciesare traded against the USE
6
three forecasting models are unbiased and their forecast errrors
are serially uncorrected . Therefore , all empirical evidences do
not allow us to reject the three specific propositions. In other
words , the hypothesisthat the Hong Kong FX market is efficient
cannot be reiected .
7CHAPTE R I I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The chapter reviews the literature on the following topics :
( i ) interest rate parity theory , ( 2 ) foreign exchangemarket
efficiency, and ( 3 ) exchangerates forecastingmodels . Besides ,
a brief look on other related issues will also be included .
2 . 1 The Relationshipbetween Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
The relationship between interest rates on similar financial
assets denominated in different currencies has been extensively
examined. ' There are two approachesto this topic , namely , the
Covered Interest Rate Parity ( CIRP ) and the Fisher parity . 2 The
former is applied to the case in which a well - organizedforward
exchange market already exists , whereas the latter is applicable
if there is no such a market . It should be noted that there is a
crucial difference between these two approaches. The CIRP does not
involve any exchange risk which can be covered in the forward
market . However , the Fisher proposition involves the exchange
risk . These two approachescoincide with each other only when the
forward exchange rate is equal to the expected exchange rate , that
is , when there is no risk premiumin the forward exchangerate .
1 This relationshipwas investigatedby Goschen ( 1864 ) .
However, Keynes ( 1923 ) later restatedit in a more precise way .
2 It was originatedby Fisher ( 1896 ) .
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Now , let us illustrate these two approachesin detail .
2 . 1 . 1 The CoveredInterestRate Parity ( CIRP )
The theorem suggests that the nominal interest differential
between two identical assets denominated in different currencies ,
at equilibrium, would be zero after the adjustmentfor exchange
rates changes and currency risks ( assuming no transactioncost ) .
This theorem works because interest arbitragers could make profits
simply by shifting short term funds from one financial centre to
other centres if there is a real interest differential . This
short term funds movement would not cease unless there no longer
exists any profit opportunities, i . e . the interest rate differential
is eliminated. Mathematically, the CIRP can be written as :
( 2 . 1 )
where Ftt + s = forward exchangerate set at time t for delivery
at timet + s ,
St = spot exchangerate set at time t ,
i = interest rate on an asset denominatedin domestic
currency for given maturity s ,
i * = interest rate on an asset denominatedin foreign
currency for given maturity s .
Equation( 2 . 1 ) can be simplifiedapproximatelyas
( 2 . 2 )
The left hand side of equation( 2 . 2 ) is called the implicit
9
interest differential .
2 . 1 . 2 The Open Fisher Proposition
The Fisher hypothesis states that when two financial assets
are similar in all respects except the currency denomination, any
nominal rate of return ( interest ) differentialwould be wiped out
by an expected change in exchange rates . In other words , interest
rate differential can be entirely explained by the expected change
in exchange rates over the period in question . The Fisher parity
conditioncan be written as :
( 2 . 3 )
where St + s is the expectedexchangerate for time is at time t ,
and the other notations carry the same meaning as that in equations
( 2 . 1 ) and ( 2 . 2 ) . Similarly, equation( 2 . 3 ) may be approximated
as:
( 2 . 4 )
It is obviousthat equation( 2 . 1 ) differsfrom ( 2 . 3 ) in that Set + s
is the expected future spot exchange rate which involves
uncertainty, while Ftt + s does not . Hence , the Fisher hypothesis
involves exchange risk . Of course , the two approacheswould be
equivalent if
( 2 . 5 )
The Fisher open hypothesis is a testable proposition only
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if there are no organized forward exchange markets . There are
not many empirical evidences on this proposition . Cumby and
Obstfeld ( 1981 ) examined this relationshipby using data from six
industrial countries for the period July 1974 - June 1980 . They
found that the propositiondid not hold . Put it differently,
assets denominated in different currencies cannot be taken as
perfect substitutes. Blejer ( 1982 ) followed Cumby and Obstfeld ' s
methodologyand conducted a Lest on this propositionfor the case
of Argentinaduring the period June 1977 - January . 1981 . His
results indicated that observed nominal interest rate differentials
did not follow any pattern of serial correlation and were simply
like forecasting errors in an efficient market . The most rational
explanation for the results is that the market is informationally
efficient . Here , we shall not review further the literature
related to this propositionsince we do not intend to conduct any
test on that hypothesis.
2 . 1 . 3 EmpiricalEvidenceson the CoveredInterest Rate Parity ( CIRP :
Numerousempirical studies on the CIRP have been done . On
the whole , the empirical results are consistentwith the CIRP . Any
deviationsfrom the parity are due to the following reasons :
( 1 ) imperfectionof capital markets , ( 2 ) domesticand foreign assets
not perfect substitutes, ( 3 ) measurementerrors , ( 4 ) political
risk , ( 5 ) transactioncosts , ( 6 ) persistentspeculativesentiments,
and ( 7 ) problemsin data collectionprocess . However, these
empirical studies generally emphasize one of the above reasons to
account for deviationsfrom the CIRP .
Branson( 1969 ) and Frenkel and Levich ( 1975 , 1977 ) asserted
11
that deviationsfrom the CIRP were caused by transactioncosts . 3
Bransontested the theorem for the currencies, namely , U . S . Dollar
( USD ) , BritishPound( BP ) , and CanadianDollar ( CD ) duringthe
period January 1959 - December 1964 by running regressions, which
are basedon equation( 2 . 2 ) , like the form of equation( 2 . 6 ) that
will be discussed later . Branson attributed any observation which
departed from the interest rate parity line to transactioncosts .
Under this premise , the transaction costs for an arbitrage operatio
was calculatedto amount to at least 0 . 18 % per annum . Frenkel and
Levich suggested an alternative procedure , which was based on the
triangular arbitrage , to estimate the transaction costs . They
appliedthe methodto USD , BP , CD , and DeutscheMark ( DM ) . The
sample period for Frenkel and Levich ( 1975 ) and ( 1977 ) are January
1962 - November1967 and January 1962 - May 1975 , respectively.
They found that the estimated transaction costs could account for
most of the deviationsfrom the interest rate parity line . Hence ,
they concluded that the empirical results were consistent with the
parity and that there were no unexp ' loited profit opportunitiesleft
in covered interest arbitrages .
On the other hand , Mc Cormick( 1979 ) casted some doubt on
Frenkel and Levi ch ' s conclusionsthat deviationsfrom the CI RP were
due to transactioncosts . He argued that Frenkel and Levich had
come to this conclusionbecause of data limitations . Similarly ,
he adopted their methodologyto re - estimate the transactioncosts
by using a higher quality data set . I t was found that the dis -
crepanciesfrom the CIRP betweenU . S . and U . K . Treasurybill . could
' Frenkel and Levich ( 1977 ) pointed out that transactioncosts
did not seem to explain unexploited profit opportunitiesduring the
excessivelyturbulentperiod ( 1968 - 1969 ) .
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not be explained solely by transaction costs . The deviations may
be caused by the stringent capital control in United Kingdom
during the period in question . It should be noticed that
Mc Cormick ' s study is importantbecause it shed some light on the
sensitivityof the estimates to the choice of data and on the
compatibility among the statistical series used in the interest
rate parity test . Besides , Callier ( 1981 ) asserted that Frenkel
and Levich overestimatedthe actual transaction costs for the
banks that were operating on the foreign exchange markets and that
transaction costs could not provide a complete explanation for
the large discrepanciesfrom the parity .
Levich ( 1979 a ) also investigatedthe CIRP under the context
of market efficiencyfor the period 1962 - 1975 . His results showed
that the foreign exchange market was efficient in the sense that
unusual profits from covered interest arbitrages could be quickly
eliminated . Any extra profit could be explained by transaction
costs.
Prachowny( 1970 ) stressed that the ' reason why the interest
rate parity condition was not always satisfied was due to capital
market imperfection, i . e . the equilibriumposition implied by the
theorem had not been reached and the theorem itself was not a
correctly specified equilibrium condition . Moreover , Aliber ( 1973 )
examined the differential between the observed forward rate and
the predicted forward rate - implied from the CIRP for the period
January 1968 - June 1970 . Two sets of interest rates , namely ,
domesticpair ( interestrates on U . S . and U . K . Treasurybills ) and
external pair ( interest rates on U . S . dollar depositsin London
and sterling deposits in Paris ) were used . It was found that the
13
differential for the domestic pair was much larger than that for
the external pair. Nevertheless, Aliber believed that the major
source of the larger deviation between the predicted forward rate
and observed forward rate is due to the fact that the interest
rates on the securities used to predict the forward rate were not
identical in terms of political risk.
Cosandier and Lang (1981) as well as Minot (1974) conducted
the CIRP test by running the following regression which is based
on equation (2.1):
(2.6)
where t is a random disturbance term a and b are the intercept
term and the coefficient of the interest rate differential, respect-
ively. If a and b are jointly equal to zero and unity, respectively,
the hypothesis for the CIRP cannot be rejected. They all found
that the empirical results were consistent with that of Aliber,
that is, the parity worked better for external pairs (Euro-Currency)
of assets than for domestic pairs. Cosandier and Lang examined the
pairs of assets denominated in USD, BP, DM and Swiss Franc (SF).
Minot (1974) investigated USD and BP. Furthermore, Cosandier and
Lang asserted that, because of the significant occurance of auto-
correlation for domestic pairs, there were possibly left-out
explanatory factors in the standard CIRP formulation.
Grubel (1966) examined U.S.-Canadian market for the CI RP
hypothesis for the period July 1955- March 1961. He also estimated
equation (2.6) and found that the constant term and the coefficient
of the interest differential were significantly different from
14
zero and one , respectively. At the same time , the residualsof
the regressionswere shown to be serially correlated . Similarly ,
the results Stoll ( 1968 ) obtainedwere the same as Grubel ' s . He
investigatedUSD , BP and CD coveringthe period 1951 - 1964 . It wa :
believed that the serially correlated residual terms was due to
persistent speculativesentiments over time . As a result , Stoll
rejected the CIRP hypothesis.
As a whole , although most of the empirical results seem to
support the theory of interest rate parity , deviations from the
parity cannot be explained only by the transaction costs argument
and therefore need necessary to be explained by other arguments
mentioned before . This may imply that the interest rate parity
theory does not take some explanatoryvariables into account . 4
2 . 2 Market Efficiency and Foreign Exchange Markets
The Efficient Market Hypothesis( EMI has been widely
examined by many researchersin stock markets , money markets and
foreign exchange markets . In this section , we will review the
followingliterature: ( 1 ) conceptsof market efficiency, ( 2 ) market
efficiencyfor foreign exchangemarkets , and ( 3 ) empirical evid -
ences on the market efficiency of foreign exchange markets .
2 . 2 . 1 Conceptsof Market Efficiency5
Betweenthe mid 1950 ' s and early 1960 ' s , there were vast
empirical studies which described the behaviour of common stock
4 For example , the Modern Theory to forward exchangerate
determinationtakes into account the role of speculators which
interest rate parity does not consider .
5 The idea of market efficiencyis not new and can be found
in Ricardo( 1811 ) , Goschen( 1864 ) , and Walras( 1870 ) .
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and other speculative prices as random walks. In fact, the
evolution of the concepts of market efficiency is based on the
development of these empirical studies.
In 1970, a classical article written by Fama (1970) covered
a comprehensive review on the theoretical and empirical aspects
for efficient markets. What is an efficient market? In Fama's
own words:
"... A market in which prices always 'fully reflect'
available information is called 'efficient'."
[Fama (1970), p. 3831
It should be understood that the concept of market efficiency is
different from that of market perfection. Market perfection is a
sufficient but not a necessary condition of market efficiency.
However, the definitional statement for an efficient market is
too general to be tested empirically. In other words, there is
no testable implications in the statement. In order to make the
hypothesis testable, the term fully reflect must be defined in
a more operational way.
If the market is efficient, we have the following model
(2.7)
where Xt= price of an asset at time t.
Xt+l= price of an asset at time t+l
= the information set available at time t assumed
to be fully reflected in the prices at time t,
E= the expectation operator,
one-period percentage return.
Equation (2.7), which is called expected return or "fair game"
Rt+1 = (Xt+1-Xt)/Xt,
E(Xt+1| t)=[1+E(Rt+1) | t]Xt
16
models , assumes that the conditions of market equilibriumcan be
stated in terms of expected returns . The implicationsof equatioi
( 2 . 7 ) is that the informationset , t , is fully utilizedin
determining equilibrium expected returns and hence t , is fully
reflected in prices regardless of whatever expected return model
to be assumed . Put it differently, there is an instantaneousand
full prices adjustment to information in an efficient market .
It should be noted that the informationset , t , in equation
( 2 . 7 ) is too general for empiricaltests . Thus , various empirical
tests could be done with respect to different informationsets .
As a result , Fama ( 1970 ) suggestedthat three levels of market
efficiencyan be defined, namely , the weak - form , semi - strong -
form , and strong - form efficiency. Operationally, Fama used
historical prices as the relevant informationset for weak - form
efficiencytests . Other public available information, e . g .
announcementsof annual earnings and stock splits is used for
semi - strong - form efficiency tests . Any monopolisticnformation
which is relevant for prices formation is used for strong - form
efficiency tests . Based on this concept , many empirical works on
capital markets efficiency had been carried out .
In accordance with the rapid developmentof empirical tests
on stock markets and money markets , market efficiency for foreign
exchangeshas been explored to a great extent . Besides , there are
several innovations for the concept of market efficiency intro -
duced by foreign exchange . These will be illustrated later .
2 . 2 . 2 The Theoreticaland Empirical Frameworkof Market Efficiency
Tests for Foreign Exchange
The weak - form EMH tests on foreign exchangeare based on
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random walk models, which are the products of the implication of
the efficient market model-equation (2. 7), that is, successive
prices changes (or one-period return) are independent, and
successive price changes (or returns) are identically distributed.
From random walk models, we have 6
(2. 8)
where Ut is a random term which is serially uncorrelated and
identically distributed. Empirically, the market efficiency test
is to examine whether the random term, Ut, is serially uncorrelated.
Of course, it is a test for the weak-form EMH. Other weak-form
EMH tests are developed, which test the hypothesis that forward
exchange rates are unbiased forecasts of future spot rates. With
regard to this form of test, it is assumed:
(2.9)
Equation (2.9) implies that there is no risk premium. Again, with
the assumption of efficient market that market participants utilize
all available information in forming expectation, we have,
(2.10)
where Vt is a random term that stands for new information available
only in time t. Hence, substituting equation (2.9)into (2.10),
we get
6It is common to use changes in log-price as the measure of
return in the random walk literature. The justification for this
formulation is that if changes in price are small, the difference
in the logarithmic price series approximately equals the percentage
price change or one-period return.
lnSt-lnSt-s =Ut




The justification for equation (2.10) can be argued as follows:
in an efficient market, expectations concerning future exchange
rates are, as noted in equation (2.9), fully reflected in forward
rates, and spot exchange rates at time t-s reflect all relevant
information available at that period. They should also contain
the information up to and including time t-s. Then, Vt reflects
new information available at time t. Hence, it should be serially
uncorrelated. Generally, empirical works regress lnSt on
lnF , that is,
(2.12)
where a and are regression coefficients. If the market for
foreign exchange is efficient, the residual, Vt, should be serially
uncorrelated. Furthermore, if the constant term, a, and the slope
coefficient, , are not significantly different from zero and
unity, respectively, the hypothesis that forward exchange rates
are unbiased predictors of future spot rates cannot be rejected.
In addition, the implication of an efficient market can be further
explored. If forward rates at time t-s contained all relevant
information available at t-s, they should also include the
information which is contained in data corresponding to time t-2s.
Hence if we include additional lagged values of forward rates,
equation (2.12) becomes:lnF
(2.13)
where Y is the coefficient of inF It follows that the
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coefficient of determination for the estimated equation should not
be greatly affected and Y should not be significantly different
from zero. 7
Further, Caves and Feige (1980) introduced a new concept for
market efficiency, incremental efficiency. They defined it as
follows:
...The foreign exchange market is said to be incrementally
efficient with respect to some type of information if the
use of that information cannot improve upon forecasts of
exchange rates which are conditional only on the history
of the exchange rate
[Caves and Feige (1980), p. 121]
However, it can be proved that if a market is both incrementally
efficient and weak-form efficient, then the market is semi-strong-
form efficient.8 Besides, Geweke and Feige (1979) also proposed
two market efficiency concepts, similar to that of Fama (1970),
namely, single market efficiency and multimarket efficiency. In
what follows, we are going to recapitulate Geweke and Feige's
operational definitions of the concepts of single market and
multimarket efficiency. In the context of the EM-I, if participants
in the market are risk neutral, then we have
(2.14)
where is the realized exchange gain
in forward market i at time t.
is forward exchange rate for currency i set at
time t-l for delivery at time t,
This part of discussion is largely based on Frenkel (1977).
For more detail discussion of this concept and related
issues. see Caves and Feize (1980) and Leung (1983).
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Sit is spot exchange rate for currency i at time t.
If equation (2.14) is true for market i, then the market is said
to be single market efficient. If the information set contains
spot and forward exchange rates for currencies 1 to N, then
(2. 15)
If equation (2.15), which is a generalization of equation (2.14),
is true for market i, the market is said to be multimarket
efficient. 9
2.2.3 Empirical Evidences on Efficient Foreign Exchange Markets10
This section surveys the empirical results of foreign exchange
market efficiency. As noted above, the empirical works are largely
the weak-form EM-I tests. Stated differently, tests are performed
by applying equation (2.8) and (2.12). However, semi-strong-form
EM-i or other forms of market efficiency tests (e.g. multimarket
efficiency) were sometimes conducted for foreign exchange markets.
With regard to results of different empirical tests, it seems
that the findings are controversial. Some empirical results, like
Poole (1967), Taya (1980) and Longworth (1981), indicated that
foreign exchange markets were inefficient. On the contrary,
Pippenger (1973), Levich (1979a)., Geweke and Feige (1979), Cornell
9In the distinction between Fama (1970)'s weak-form efficiency
and the single market efficiency as well as his semi-strong-form
efficiency and the multimarket efficiency, see Geweke and Feige
(1979), p. 336, footnote 4.
luHere, we are going to make a brief review on the relevan-
empirical literatures of foreign exchange market efficiency. Fo:
a detail survey. see Levich (1979b).
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and Dietrich (1978), Papadia (1981), Frenkel (1977, 1981), and
Leung (1983) did discover that foreign exchange markets, in
general, were efficient.
Poole (1967), Cornell and Dietrich (1978), and Leung (1983)
investigated the random walk models for foreign exchanges by auto-
correlation tests. However, their results were not consistent
with each other. Poole examined the data for nine currencies
during the flexible rates for the period following World War I,
and for Canadian dollar for the period 1950-1969.11 He found that
the empirical evidences were not consistent with the ENE. On the
contrary, Cornell and Dietrich, after investigation of six curren-
cies for the period March 1973- Sept. 1975, concluded that the
foreign exchange markets did not depart from the EMH. In addition,
Leung (1983)'s results were inconclusive. He showed that the
foreign exchange markets for Hong Kong Dollar (HKD)/DM, HKD/USD,
and HKD/Japanese Yen (JY) were weak-form inefficient, whereas those
for HKD/BP, HKD/Taiwanese Dollar (NT), and HKD/Singapore Dollar
(SD) were weak-form efficient. Furthermore, the HKD/USD market
was semi-strong-form inefficient and the markets for HKD/BP and
HKD/NT were semi-strong-form efficient.
Frenkel (1977, 1981) and Longworth (1981) applied equation
(2.12) and found that foreign exchange markets were weak-form
efficient. Frenkel (1977, 1981) studies the DM/BP for the period
February 1921- August 1923, and the exchange rates for BP, French
Franc (FF) and DM for the period June 1973- July 1979. The con-
clusions of Frenkel's studies, which were consistent with each other,
11Throughout the rest of this chapter, all foreign exchanges
are quoted against the U.S. Dollar unless specified.
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indicated that foregin exchange market were efficient. On the
other hand, Longworth (1981) found that the market for USD/CD
was weak-form efficient but was semi-strong-form inefficient for
the period July 1970- December 1978.
Geweke and Feige (1979) tested the EIRE of the foreign exchange
markets for the currencies of Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Swither-
land and United Kingdom for the period 1962-1977. The empirical
tests were conducted on the basis of their innovated concepts,
namely, the single market efficiency and the multimarket efficiency.
Both concepts are defined in equation (2.14) and (2.15). Geweke
and Feige discovered that the single market efficiency hypothesis
could be accepted for foreign exchange market, while the multimarket
efficiency hypothesis could not be accepted. Their findings
implied that there were limitations on the extent to which market
participants (economic agents) integrated information across
markets and used it rationally. At the same time, Geweke and
Feige argued that efficiency for foreign exchange market was
primary precluded by transaction cbsts and risk aversion for the
period 1962-1967 and the period 1972-1977, respectively.
In conclusion, foreign exchange markets seem to be efficient
in the sense of weak-form efficiency. However, the markets for
foreign exchange cannot pass the semi-strong-form EMH test in many
cases.
2.3 Foreign Exchange Rate Forecasting
In the business and commercial world, there are mainly
three approaches to foreign exchange rate forecasting, which are
called fundamental analysis, technical analysis and market
sentiment. Fundamental analysis considers the effects of factors
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such as economic variables and government policies on future
exchange rates. Lagged prices movement and their ability to
predict future exchange rates movement are embodied into technical
analysis. Market sentiment seeks to discern the dominant social-
psychological factors supporting the exchange rate trend and to
determine whether this trend will persist in the future. Borsuk
(1982) asserted that market sentiment was superior than the other
two methods for predicting short-term movement of exchange rates.
In fact, the above three approaches may be operationized as
exchange rate forecasting models. These models can be classified,
in general, into three categories, namely, structural models,
pure forecasting models, and arbitrage models. In this section,
we will pay our attention to the last two kinds of models. Mean-
while, we would like to give a brief discussion on structural
models.
The formulation of structural models for foreign exchange
rate forecasting is more or less based on the leading and well-
known theories of exchange rate determination, namely, the
purchasing-power-parity theory, the Keynesian theory, the monetary
approach, and the asset approach. 12
pproach .12 These structural models for
exchange rate forecasting have been tested on different currencies
for different periods. On the whole, as supported by empirical
evidences, price levels, the money supply, the income level and
interest rates are underlying determinants of exchange rates. 13
12To review the purchasing-power-parity theory, for example,
see Officer (1976) the monetary approach, see Kreinin and Officer
(1978) the Keynesian theory, see Officer (1981) the asset
approach, see Whitman (1975).
See Levich (1979a), chapter 2, footnote 17.
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Hodgson ( 1972 ) and Bilson ( 1976 ) have utilized structuralmodels
to forecast exchange rates . However , almost all the structural
models suffer from the defect that the exogenous variables must
be predictedin advance so as to make the models useful in
forecasting. And , it should be noticed that if a structural
model includes lagged variables as exogenous variables , it is
clearly inconsistentwith the EMU , since all informationhas been
fully reflected by current variables .
2 . 3 . 1 Pure ForecastingModels
Levich defined a pure forecastingmodel as a model which
forecasts in apparent abstraction from typical economic behavioral
relationships[ Levich ( 1979 a ) , p . 75 ] . One of the approaches
to build up a pure forecastingmodel is to base it on time series
analysis . Of course , the time series descriptionof spot exchange
rates may be useful for forecastingbecause it is believed that
the underlying factors determining exchange rates are generated
by a stationaryprocess . In general , they are based on univariate
time series analysis . 14 The univariate Auto Regressive Moving
Average ( ARMA ) , which has been analysedin great detail by Box and
Jenkins , is widely used in economic forecasting. Since only past
prices are utilized , it seems that the model does not incorporate
any structural informationi to the forecast . In fact , it is
consistent with the EMH that prices fully reflect all available
information. As a result , the model ' s forecast reflects the
economic structural information . The simplest form of pure
14 The multiple input transfer function model is a general
statistical approach to analyse the time series data .
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forecastingmodels is the random walk model with zero drift . 15
More specifically, we may describe the behavior of exchange rates
as
( 2 . 16)
where St + s is the forecastof the future spot rate for time t + s
at time t .
Another type of pure forecastingmodel is composite fore -
casts models which incorporate different forecasts implied by
different forecasting models . However , according to the rational
expectation hypothesis , all forecasting models would lead to the
same and correct forecasts , provided that these models are
correctly specified . However , factors like transaction costs ,
information costs , model specificationsand data problems may lead
to different forecasts for different forecasting models . Thus ,
the forecast errors can be reduced by constructinga composite
forecast , provided that the forecast errors of these different
models are not perfectly correlated : Operationally, the
constructionof a composite forecast can be achieved by the
following regression analysis ,
( 2 . 17)
where Pt = compositeforecast at time t ,
Pit = forecast from forecastingmodel i at time t ,
ai = regressioncoefficient( i = 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . n ) .
Unfortunately, equation ( 2 . 17 ) tells us nothing about the underlying
15 Obviously, it is a special case of the ARMA models .
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structure that determinesthe exchange rate . It should be noted
that the coefficient may answer the question - - which model reflects
consistenlty and accurately all available information ?
2 . 3 . 2 Arbitrageand SpeculationModels
There are several exchange rate forecasting models based on
the arbitrage and speculationin foreign exchange . One of the
models is connectedwith the Fisher parity , which has been
discussedin . length in Section 2 . 1 . In the absenceof uncertainty
the one - period lead forecast of future spot rate can be derived
from equation( 2 . 3 ) 16
( 2 . 18)
e
whereSt + s ( = St + s ) is the one - period( the lengthof time is s )
forecast and other notationsare denoted as those in Section 2 . 1 .
Equation( 2 . 18 ) implies that to predict future spot rates , only
interest rates are required. As a result , it cannot give us a
complete picture about the relationship between exchange rates
and other economic variables other than interest rates . Equation
( 2 . 18 ) can be treated as a reducedform equationfrom an economic
16 Equation( 2 . 18 ) is establishedon the assumptionthat
there is no transactioncosts . With the presence of transaction
cost , forecastsmay lie betweenthe upper bound ( U ) and lower
bound( L ) given by
where
ti = cost of transactioni ,
n = no . of transactionsrequired to take speculativeposition .
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structural model. This forecasting model may potentially involve
forecast errors. The presence of transaction costs may induce a
source of forecast errors even in the world of perfect foresight
and rational behaviour. Other sources of forecasting bias are
political risk and currency preference as suggested by Aliber
(1975). Political risk results from asset being issued by or
traded in different political areas. Convenience or other non-
pecuniary benefit connected with a currency will result in
currency preference. In these cases, the nominal interest rate
does not fully reflect the real situation and hence the Fisher
parity implied forecast is biased. 17
Another arbitrage model used to forecast future spot rates
is forward exchange rates. As discussed in Section 2. 1, in the
absence of transaction costs and uncertainty, the Fisher parity
and the CIRP will coincide with each other, that is
From equation (2.18), we have 18
(2.19)
In fact, the properties of forward rates will be the same as the
forecast that is based on the Fisher parity model. Undoubtedly,
transaction costs in foreign exchange operations may produce
17An investor is exposed to exchange risk since he deals with
uncovered interest arbitrages. Thus, biased forecasts will be
produced by the Fisherian approach because St+s is uncertain.
For further detail, see Solnik (1973).
18 Some readers may note that forward rates as forecasts of
future spot rates may not rely on the CIRP and the Fisher parity.
In the efficient market discussion in the last section, we know
that Ft+s is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate if
the market is efficient and if traders are risk neutral.
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forecast errors in forward rates.19 It should be underscored
that the forward rate, according to the Modern 'Theory of forward
exchange rates determination, is a biased forecast for the future
spot rate. 20
Before leaving this part of discussion, we will take a
brief look at the criteria for analyzing the performance of
forecasting model. The most standard criterion to select a fore-
casting model is by means of the Mean Squared Error (VISE). The
model with minimum MSE will be selected.21 Kohlhagen (1975) and
Giddy and Dufey (1975), for example, used this methodology to
evaluate their forecasting models.
2.3.3 Empirical Evidences on the Performance of Forecasting Models
There are many empirical studies on the performances of
different forecasting models, especially in testing whether forward
rates are unbiased forecasts of future spot rates. Agmon and
Amihud (1981), Frenkel (1977, 1981), Cornell (1977), Papadia (1981),
Kaserman (1973), Longworth (1981), Porter (1971) and Levich (1979a)
are only a portion of these numerous studies.
Agmon and Amihud (1981) examined three currencies, namely,
19Based on the Jensen's inequality, Siegel (1972), Roper
(1975) and McCulloch (1975) proved that the forward rate was a
basied estimator of currency price.
20The Modern Theory explicitly takes into account not only
the behavior of arbitragers as the CIRP does, but also that of
traders, hedgers and speculators. And the theory suggests that
the speculators' schedule of forward contract is less than
infinitely elastic. However, if speculators are risk neutral,
the forward rate would be an unbiased predictor of future spot
rate.
21This criterion, which is due to Nelson (1973). assumes that
forecasters have quadratic ulitity function and hence the loss from
incorrect forecasts increases with the square of the forecasting
errors.
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the DM, BP and SF during the period 1.973-1977. Their results
indicated that although forward rates produced unbiased forecasts,
they failed to track fluctuations in future spot rates and poorly
reflected their variations. Besides, the lagged spot rate (random
walk model with zero drift) performed better than the forward
rate in forecasting future spot rates. On the other hand, Cornell
(1977) found that the performance of current spot rate as
predictor for future spot rate was similar to that of forward
rate for the BP, CD, FF, DM, SF, JY and Dutch Guilder (DG) for
the period 1973-1977 except for the FF. Besides, forward rates
were unbiased predictors of future spot rates.
Frenkel (1977, 1981) tested the hypothesis that forward
rates were unbiased forecasts for future spot rates. His results
for these two empirical studies were inconsistent. On the one
hand, Frenkel (1977) showed that forward rates were not unbiased
predictors for future spot rates. On the other hand, Frenkel
(1981) concluded that, for the period June 1973- July 1977,
forward rates were unbiased forecasts for future spot rates for
the FF, the DM and the BP. Furthermore, he pointed out that using
forward rates as forecasts of future spot rates was very imprecise.
Frenkel took into account the news to cope with this volatility
of exchange rate movement. It was found that news was a
significant factor to affect exchange rate movement. The degree
of imprecision could be reduced by taking news into consideration
Longworth (1981) also found that forward rates were unbiased
predictors of future spot rates for the exchange rate, CD, during
the period July 1970- December 1978. At the same time, the
current spot rate provided a better forecast for the future spot
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rate than the current forward rate did in terms of root mean square
errors. Similarly, Papadia (1981) obtained the results which were
consistent with that of Cornell (1977). There is no evidence of
a constant bias in using the forward rate to predict the future
spot rate.
Kaserman (1973) investigated the forecasting performance of
ninety days Canadian dollar forward rates for the period July 1955
March 1961. Forward rates tended to be biased forecasts. In
addition, the bias followed a predictable time pattern--when the
spot rate was increasing, the forward rate tended to underestimate
future spot rates and vice versa. Still, forward rates were not
statistically different from future spot rates.
Porter (1971) established a model in which interest rates
were used to predict exchange rate movements. The model was
tested with respect to the exchange rate of CD during the period
1953-1960. The sign was correct except for the case of three-
month forecasting horizon. The performance of the two-year model
was the best, that is, interest rates produced unbiased forecasts.
Besides, Porter also examined the forward rate forecasting
ability and discovered that the three-month forward rate was a
very bad predictor of changes in exchange rates.
Levich (1979a) examined four forecasting models, namely,
the Fisher parity with respect to external interest rates (Fisher
external model), the Fisher parity with respect to domestic
interest rates (Fisher internal model), the forward rate model,
and the random walk model. The data used were exchange rates of
Canada, United Kingdom, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Nether-
lands, Switzerland and Japan. Since the average ratio of the
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highest MSE to the, lowest MSE was 1.05 for all 27 "country-
horizon", the performance of these models was of little difference.
Besides, the Fisher external model and the random walk model
performed marginally better than the other two models. It is
surprising that the Fisher external model always outperforms the
forward rate, although the difference is small enough to be
explained by transaction costs or sampling errors. This is
because the Fisher external model and forward rate would produce
identical forecasts if the interest parity holds exactly. In
addition, forward rates were found to be biased in forecasting
future spot rates. In fact, this can be explained by transaction
costs and hence there is no economic significance. Finally,
Levich applied equation (2.17) to forecast future spot rates by
using forecasts from the Fisher external model, the Fisher internal
model, the forward rate and the random walk model as inputs. The
MSE of composite forecasts, in general, was substantial reduced.
This may be due to differential transaction costs or information
costs across different markets.
On the whole, the statement of forward rates as unbiased
forecasts (predictors) of future spot rates is valid. However,
some results indicate that forward rates cannot track fluctuations
of future spot rates. Surprisingly, the simple naive model,
random walk model (or Martingale model), performs better than the
forward rate model.
2.4 Final Remarks
We have reviewed the literature of the interest rate parity
theory, market efficiency for foreign exchange and exchange rate
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forecasting models. This review provides us with the theoretical
backup for the empirical studies in this thesis. As noted in
Chapter I, we are going to examine the hypothesis that the Hong
Kong foreign exchange market is efficient. More specifically,
the following three propositions are investigated. Proposition
one considers whether the institutional and operational aspects
are consistent with the EMH. Proposition two takes into account
the CI RP hypothesis. And, proposition three concerns about the
weak-form EMH and the forecasts of market-based forecasting
models. In. fact, the methodology of our empirical tests for
proposition two and three have been discussed in detail in this
review. Specifically, the empirical test on the CIRP hypothesis
is based on equation (2.6) the EMH is based on equation (2.8),
(2.12)5 (2.13). And, we will examine the three forecasting
models, the lagged spot model, the Fisher parity model, and the
forward rate model, which have also been specified by equation
(2.16), (2.18) and (2.19), respectively.
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CHAPTER I I I
THE HONG KONG FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET:
THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS
Hong Kong has emerged as a financial centre since the early
1970s. At the end of 1982, there were 128 licensed banks and
361 deposit-taking companies (DTCs). Out of 128 licensed banks,
93 are foreign incorporated. Of 361 deposit-taking companies,
about half were foreign-owned. At the same time, there were about
117 representative offices. 39.0 per cent of total liabilities
and 59.8 per cent of total assets for banks in Hong Kong were
external.' Besides, for the segment of DTCs, 44.9 per cent and
71.8 per cent of the total liabilities and assets, respectively,
were external. This indicates that Hong Kong's financial sector
are largely internationally oriented. As noted in Ho (1982b):
...Nowadays, you can easily arrange a current account
in a local Chinese bank, put your savings in a British
bank, open a time deposit account in an American
finance company, or buy your insurance policy from a
French company. Hong Kong has developed into an
international financial centre..."
[Ho (1982b), p. 601
In fact, Hong Kong is, more specifically, a regional finan-
cial centre in the Asian-Pacific area. According to the latest
available information, all the largest net borrowers2 belong to
1 End of December, 1982 figures.
2Non-bank borrowers.
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the Asian-Pacific area.3 In order of their importance, they are
South Korea, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Taiwan, Australia,
Malaysia, Japan and New Zealand.
In the process of evolving into a financial centre, many
of Hong Kong's financial markets, namely, the stock market, the
money market, the gold market, and the foreign exchange (FX)
market have experienced substantial growth. In this chapter, we
are going to discuss the institutional aspects of the Hong Kong
FX market and to examine proposition one--the market environment
is consistent with the BE. It should be noted that the following
discussion is largely based on in-depth interviews, which were
conducted during the period September 1982- April 1983,4 on five
leading banks and one exchange broker firm in Hong Kong. Key
personnels were interviewed and questions asked were standardized.5
Since our aim is to construct the institutional framework and not
behavioural relationships, and since those five banks interviewed
have the lion's share of the FX market, it is not worthwhile to
pursue a more comprehensive survey. Yet, before we turn to discuss
the historical background and development of the Hong Kong FX
market, a word about the feature of the market is given. It is
difficult to delineate the Hong Kong FX market because there is no
centralized location for foreign exchange dealings like the Hong
Libera and Jamaica, which are also two of the largest
borrowers of Hong Kong, are excluded in the list because of the
most well-known reason that most Hong Kong owned shipping
companies are incorporated there.
4The name list of the interviewee banks and broker firm as
well as the schedule of interviews are shown in Appendix I.
5See Appendix II for the major questions asked in the
interviews.
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Kong Gold and Silver Society. All foreign exchange transactions
are done by phones or telecommunication equipments through which
foreign exchange markets over the world are integrated. In other
words, foreign exchange trading would occur at any time anywhere
in the world. However, in order to facilitate our discussions,
the Hong Kong FX market can be viewed as a market in which domestic
located economic agents (banks, DTCs, corporations, etc.) under-
take foreign exchange activities among themselves and with other
parties abroad.
3.1 Historical Background and Development of the Market
The history of the Hong Kong FX market is a long one. In
the pre-war period, foreign exchange dealings between banks,
between banks and firms had to be settled via brokers who had
good connections with banks. At that time, brokers did not have
their own offices. They just made transactions through telephones
at home. In the post-war period, the board amount for each
transaction was about £1, 000. Later, in 1963, the board amount
was increased to about L10.,000 or £20, 000. The standard trading
amount for a contract is now one million U.S. Dollars (USD).
Before June 1972, there was a formal nominal exchange control
system. Exchange rates were controlled by the Exchange Banks
Association (EBA). 6
It should be noted that this exchange control system did
not mean to protect Hong Kong's reserves. In fact, its objective
6Before June 1972, Hong Kong was a member of the sterling
area. Since then, Hong Kong no longer belonged to the sterling
area.
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was to maintain Hong Kong as a member of the sterling area. The
rates jointly determined by authorized exchange banks and the
authorized exchange brokers were called "agreed merchant rates",
with a rather wide spread which would always exceed 500 basis
point.8 It is interesting to note that along with the formal
controlled market, there was a free market for the USD and other
covertible currencies. Undoubtedly, the exchange rates quoted
in the free market was better than those quoted by the EBA. For
example, if anyone had a bank draft denominated in USD, it was
possible that the exchange rate of USD set by the EBA is HK$5.63
(buying rate) .9 However, it might be HK$5.65 in the free market.
After 1973, the nominal exchange control no longer existed.
Before 1973, the FX market was relatively small. Not many
market participants were in the market. There were only six
broker firms and seventy-eight licensed banks in 1965. Besides,
all brokers were of local origin without any international
connections. The first international broker entering the Hong
Kong market was the Astley and Pearce (HK) Ltd. in late 1972 its
former name called Patrick Jones. Other international brokers
followed suit. The entry of international brokers forced the
brokers' industry in Hong Kong to upgrade their quality of
services, to provide fine quotations of rates (narrower spread
between buying and selling rate) and increase the frequency of
reporting the prevailing exchange rate quotations.
'This point has been mentioned by Lee and Jao (1982),
Chapter II, p. 19.
8A basis point means one hundredth cent of HKD.
9Buying and selling rates are viewed from the market.
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Before 1973, the turnover of the market for foreign exchange
dealings is not very large. However, the transaction volume of
foreign exchange dealings had been boosted by the influx of
foreign banks after 1978. In addition, both the development of
the deposit-taking companies and the lifting of the moratorium on
new bank licenses in 1978 had a favorable impact on the develop-
ment of the Hong Kong FX market. 10
The market had developed in greater depth and width. At
that time, the foreign banks and foreign-owned DTCs, however, did
not have sufficient Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) deposits base to
support their local borrowing and lending business. As a matter
of course, a better alternative for these financial institutions
to build up their HKD bases quickly is through foreign exchange
dealings in the market. It is worth noting that the foreign
exchange dealing which is very much different from the traditional
borrowing and lending business, 11 is a non-balance sheet business
and would not appear in any form on the balance sheet of the bank.
Consequently, the rate of return would seem to be higher.
Although the FX market is an important segment in the
financial sector of the Hong Kong economy, there has been no
official statistics for the trading volume of the Hong Kong market.
Haddon-Cave (1980) estimated the average daily turnover of the
market was about US$2.5 billion.12 According to our interviews,
10A moratorium on the grant of bank licences was imposed
after the banking crisis in 1965.
11It is because foreign exchange dealing is a kind of con-
tingent liability which does not need to be reported in the
balance sheet according to accounting practice.
iZPhilip Haddon-Cave (1980), Para. 54.
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the estimated transaction, volume in the Hong Korig FX market per
working day was on average US$10 billion in 1982. However, the
variations may be large, ranging from a daily turnover of US$4
billion on a quiet day to US$16 billion on a busy day. Hence,
the average daily turnover in 1982 seems to be four times of that
in 1979. This indicates the rapid development of the market.
On the whole, although the Hong Kong FX market has existed
for a long time, we envisage that it began to gain international
status during the 1970s. Apparently, the relaxation of moratorium
on new bank licences and the passing of Deposit-Taking Companies
Ordinance were vital elements to stimulate the trading volume of
the market. Needless to say, the well-established infrastructures
such as good telecommunication equipments, outstanding banking
facilities and professional management staff could enhance the
development potential of the foreign exchange market. In addition,
not only the absence of foreign exchange control but also the
positive nori-interventionism attitude of the Hong Kong government
has definitely helped the market to grow. What is more important
is that there is a sufficiently large external trade volume to
support the foreign exchange activities in Hong Kong. The average
real growth rate for total export and total import were 10.8 per
cent and 10.2 per cent, respectively, for the period 1973-1982.13
Consequently, it is no doubt that the market can grow rapidly
and perform well.
1.'The average real growth rate is simply the arithmetic
average of the period in question. The source of raw data is from
1983 Economic Prospects, Hong Kong Government Printer.
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3.2 The Structure of the Market
Generally, the FX market can be identified to be inter-bank
level and customer-bank level. The customer-bank level means the
activities between financial institutions and customers (small
traders, tourists, individuals). The inter-bank level means the
activities including bank-to-bank, DTC-to--DTC, bank-to-DTC, and
bank (DTC) -to-corporations. On the customer-bank level., the
transaction amount is small relative to those of the inter-bank
level and there is no standard amount for a foreign exchange deal.
The spread for the quotation is larger than that of the inter-
bank level. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we shall pay
our major attention to the Hong Kong FX market on the level of
inter-bank.
3.2.1 Market Participants
Banks, DTCs and large corporations are the participants of
the market. All these market participants may act as either
interest arbitragers, speculators or hedgers However, DTCs are
more speculative in the market. It should be noted that exchange
brokers are also involved in the market. However, the exchange
brokers are not supposed to take any positions and they only act
as a middle man between two concerned parties of a foreign exchange
deal. Hence, we shall discuss them in this section but do not
regard them as market participants. Any institutions in the market
must have credit lines (limits) with some other participants, 14
otherwise the institutions would not be to enter the market to make
14'Ibe (upper limit) credit line given to one participant by
other participant depends on one's evaluation of the past perfor-
mance of other party.
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foreign exchange dealings. Stated differently, two parties
(participants) making a contract for foreign exchange transac-
tions must have credit line with each other. Besides, the contract
size of a transaction (or the total outstanding balance of trans-
actions to the counter-party) is limited by their respective
credit limit. For example, suppose that Bank A wants to sell
10,000,000 USD in exchange for HKD with Bank B. While Bank B
only gives a credit line amounting to 5,000,000 USD to Bank A.
As a result, the maximum trading amount for them is only 5,000,000
USD. As noted before, there are 128 banks and 361 DTCs in
Hong Kong. Nevertheless, not all of them actively participate in
the market. Totally, only one hundred of them are active in the
market. The most active participants in the Hong Kong market
are the Citibank, Hong Kong Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
of New Fork, Bank of Tokyo, Bank of China, Swiss Bank Corporation,
Bankers Trust Company, Chase 'Manhattan Bank, Bank of America,
Hang Seng Bank, Midland Bank, Jardine Fleming and Wardley Limited.
Hence, you may find that foreign banks are amongst the most
active market participants. Further, we may break down the degree
of activity for these participants according to individual
currencies traded. This is clearly shown in Table 3.1 which
indicates a general pattern that banks, in general, actively deal
their respective parent-country's currency. It should be noted
that Bank of China seems to be a buyer of USD at all times.
Besides, a conservative estimate shows that the five interviewee
banks may capture 18 percent of the market turnover.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention brokers who do play an
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Table 3.1
Active Market Participants and Currencies
Traded in the Hong Kong Market
Currency Participants
Deutsche Mark Citibank, N.A., Morgan Guaranty Trust
(DM Company of. New York, Bank of Tokyo,
Swiss Bank Corporation, Bankers Trust
Company, Union Bank of Swi. tzerland,
Credit Suisse, Chase Manhattan Bank,
Bank of America
Japanese Yen Barak of Tokyo, Fuji Bank, Mitsubishi
Bank, Bankers Trust Company(JY)
Hong Kong Dollar Hong Kong Bank, Hang Seng Bank,
Citibank, Bank of China, Bank of(HKD)
America, Chase Manhattan, Overseas
Trust Bank, Jardine Fleming,
Ka Wah Bank, Hang Lung Bank, Wardley
Limited
British Pound Citibank, Morgan Guaranty Trust
Company of New York, Hong Kong Bank(BP)
Midland Bank, and other European
banks, Barclays Bank
Swiss Franc Swiss Bank Corporation, Bankers Trust
Company, Citibank, Union Bank of(SF)
Switzerland, Credit Suisse.
Source: Based on the interviews
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active part in forming the contract of a foreign exchange deal
but do not take position itself. Although a. contract for a
foreign exchange transaction need. not be made via brokers, the
brokers still play an important role. There are eleven broker
firms, all of which are members of the Hong Kong Foreign Exchange
and Deposit Brokers' Association (HKFXDBA). Six of them are
international brokers. In general, the competition among brokers
is keen. Besides, the entrance of foreign brokers may lower the
market share of local brokers. Out or this limited number of
brokers, there are three types of membership, namely, the founder
members, full members, and associate members. Fot.der member
and full member can deal in all currencies, whereas associate
members, which are generally international brokers, can do
trading in all currencies except for the HKID. The difference
between founder members and full members is that the former has
some privileges such as voting power to overrule the decision to
admit a new member.
Table 3.2 is a complete list of the brokers in Hong Kong.
Besides, these broker firms serve the banks and. DTI's only but not
large corporations. When foreign brokers came to the market in
the early 1970s, they dealt with large corporations. Later,
foreign brokers stopped their business with large corporations
because of undisclosed reasons. Apparently, it seems that broker
firms do not play a significant role in the FX market because of
the existence of direct deal between participants in Hong Kong.
In fact, broker firms are places in which all participants can
get information about what the market is going on. They serve as
an important channel for the information to diffuse to all market
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Table 3.2
Foreign Exchange Broker Fi_rrrs in Honk Kong
Firms MembershipOrigin
Higas Co. Ltd. Founder memberLocal
Hon Kong Brokers Full memberLocal




Iriteaern.ationa.l Full me asb e rPedder Mart-in Ltd.
Tui Lett E Riley
Associate memberInten1ationaI
(Holdings) Ltd.
LocaI Founder member.Allied Exchange Ltd.
Astley Pearce








Local Founder memberI Caridon Co. Ltd
Note: *This broker firm can deal. deposits business
(borrowing and lending) only.
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participants and they provide signals for proper trading.
Undoubtedly, the monopolistic nature of the brokers' industry
in Hong Kong seems to be strong. This is one of the reasons
why the brokerage tariff is almost the highest in the world.
In addition, it is interesting that there is a sophisticated
relationship between the HKAB and the HKFXDBA, which is known
by few people. Although the membership for broker firms is
issued by the HKFXDBA, it has to be recognized by the HKAB.
Finally, the relationships among participants in the
market is summarized in Fig. 3.1.
3.2.2 Currencies Traded in the Market
All convertible currencies are traded in the Hong Kong FX
market. However, the degree of activity in terms of trading
volume for different currencies varies greatly. The most active
currencies, in order of their trading volume, are Deutsche Mark
(DM), Japanese Yen (JY), HKD, British Pound (BP), and Swiss Franc
(SF). 15 The estimated market share of the respective currencies
is shown in Table 3.3.
It should be noted that the first two active currencies in
the Hong Kong FX market is UM and JY but not HKD. In fact, we
need not be surprised because DM and JY are also the most active
currencies traded in other major financial centres over the world.
The fundamental reason is that West Germany and Japan are, res-
pectively, the second and third largest exporting countries in the
15 Of course,, USD is the most active currency because of its
nature as a medium of exchange. In other words, all exchange
rates are quoted in terms of USD in the Hong Kong inter--bank FX
market.
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Fig. 3.1 The Relationships among Participants
in the Hong Kong Inter-bank FX Market
Participant A (local) Participant B (local)











The Share of Trading Volume for Currencies









world after the U.S.A. lb Besides, DM has other favorable factors
such as being a major currency in Europe and no exchange control,
which promote DM to be the most active currency in the FX market
over the world. From November 1982 to the present (April, 1983),
the Hong Kong FX market has been less active than usual. Mere
are two reasons for this phenomenon. The first one is the
uncertainty about the future of Hong Kong after 1997. This
makes the trading volt ne of T.T. market 1 thin and hence the
exchange rate for HKD fluctuates greatly. The recent crisis in
the financial sector in Hong Kong is the second reason. Banks
cut (tighten) their credit lines to DTCs for fear of the bank-
ruptcy of these companies. As a result, DTCs cannot help reducing
their activities on foreign exchange dealings, and some of those
even withdraw completely from the market because they are deprived
of their original credit lines. Inevitably, the turnover of
the T.T. segment as well as the Hong Kong FX market is bound to
decline at the present stage. For example, the Dollar Credit and
Axona were once two of the most active DTCs in the market, but
recently their names have dropped out from the market because of
their bankruptcy.
3.2.3 Conventional Practice and Disciplines in the Market
a. Wars of Dealing end Quotations--A foreign exchange dealing
between two market participants can be done through two channels:
(1) via broker firms which must be members of the HKFXDBA and
16 In 1981, the total volume export for U.S.A., hest Germany
and Japan were US$234, 176, and 152 billion, respectively.
17T.T. means telegraphic transfer.
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(2) direct calling by means of telecommunication equipments. The
deals made between two parties via brokers are indirect deals
and that through direct calling on the counter-party are direct
deals. As noted before, broker firms do not manage large cor-
porations' business and hence if they wnat to enter the market,
they have to be through direct calling to the prospective counter-
party. In a direct calling, the quotation 'of rates to the
counter-party is two-way i.e. buying and selling rates. 18 it
should be noted that large corporations can call banks directly
to ask the quotations of rates, however, banks cannot ask large
corporations for quotations. On the other hand, banks and DTCs
can give either buying rate, seeling rate, or both buying and
selling rate to broker firms which in turn give two-way
quotations to customers. The broker firm will choose the
narrowest spread between buying rate and selling rate among all
the quotations from banks and DTCs. Since the quotation of rates
for an indirect deal. way be combined by several quotations of
several banks while that of a direct deal is only quoted by one
bank. As a result, the spread of a direct deal is usually wider
than an indirect deal. Besides, through direct deals, banks and
other participants are able to make larger volume transactions
than that made through brokers in general., It is because the
standard amount for a direct deal is larger than that for an
18 Taking T. T. market as an example, the actual way of
quotation in a dealing room is 20-40. This means that the
buying rate for US$100 is HK$684.20 the selling rate for
US$100 is HK$684.40.
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indirect deal. Nvlost importantly, banks can ensure the amount
of contract by a direct deal while an indirect deal has greater
variation. The reason is that bank can go through several direct
dealings to make foreign exchange deals simultaneously and hence
the amount can be dealt in a very large amount at a moment of
time. On the other hand, this cannot be achieved by .-indirect
dealings because only one counter-parity is available to make a
contract for the bank a t the prevailing broker's quotation of
rates. Also, banks (DTCs) need not pay any brokerage fees for
direct deals. Generally, a parti c-pant who always makes direct
foreign exchange deals has many credit lines in the market.
Participants with fewer credit lines usually adopt indirect
deals. The reason is that brokers can easily help participants
to find a counter--parity to make a contract. At the same time,
the information costs may be reduced. Occassionally, if two
parties are without credit lines with each other, it i s possible
that brokers can find a rp..ddle man (a bank) who has credit
lines with both concerned parties. Through this middle man, the
foreign exchange deal can be made for two parties which are
without credit lines with each other. Finally, we recapitulate
the operation process as well as the delivery mechanism of a
foreign exchange deal in Fig. 3.2a and Fig. 3.2b. It should be
noted that in Fig. 3.2b transactions involving the USD and the
HKD are delivery at New York and Hong Kong, respectively. Of
course, other currencies are delivered at their respective
' The standard amount of an indirect deal. is US$1 million
for any currencies except the BP. I t is £1 million for the BP
a direct deal is US$3 million for the HKD and the JY, f3 million
for the BP, and US$S million for the DM, respectively.
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Dealers , participant Dealers , participant
( bank) B( bank) A
direct / indirect






Settlement Department Settlement Department
of A of B
Note : a Main items written in he memo are rates , contract
size ( amount ) , currenciesinvolved, counter - party ,
date and time .
Fig . 3 . 2 a The Processof Makinga Contract
Bank Ab Bank B
Cashier cheque
denominatedin HKD
send the sent today send the order for




bank of A in bank of B in




Note : b AssumingBank A is the buyer of USD and
seller of HKD .
c It is a clearingsystemfor banksin U . S . A .
Fig . 3 . 2 b The DeliveryMechanismfor
a T . T . Contract
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country's financial centre e.g. Yen is delivered at Tokyo.
b. Tyy es of Contract...Thhere are two broad categories of
0
contract, namely, spot and swap contract. The value day, for
a spot contract is two .working clays after the transaction has
been made except for the HKD and the JY. Con. tracts for HKD
and JY' s value day are today and tomorrow, respectively
However, i the contract is rude after 2:50 p,m., the value
day for the HKD {gill, be tomorrow because of the ciea.ring problem.
A few banks advocate the value day for the HKD to be tomorrow.
This value for today for the HKD has been criticised in that
it is not a good system from the practical point of view
because the documentary processing of a FX contr act is time-
consuming.
The swap contract means that a. sale and a purchase (or a
purchase and sale) are dealt simultaneously against the same
An other form of foreign exchange transaction is forwar
maturity of these contr acts ranges from one to six month In
practice, if you have credit line in the bank, you may book a
contract in a bank for. ny maturity day. Unlike a future
contract, there is no need to pay margin deposit for a forward
contract. And it is believed that the trading volume of the
forward market, which is affected by the market situation
(whether it is risky or not), is much less than the external
trade volume of Hong Kong. I t may imply that importers and.
exporters do not rely on the forward market much to cover their
exchange risk, Normally, one, two and three Month contracts
are always made in the market.
21If the value day is a bank holiday, it will be the
following day.
contrcts ,which are deal on the bank-customer level, The
52
currency at different delivery day.The maturity of swap
contracts usually ranges from one day to six month. The
counter-party and the contract amount are usually identical in
a swap transaction. In fact, a swa.p contract consists of two
transactions, namely, a spot contract selling (buying) one
currency and a forward contract buying (selling) this currency
with the counter-party. The swap transactions allow a financial
institution (usually a foreign one) short of HKD to acquire them
from a local licensed bank by selling an equivalent amount of
LSD (or other foreign currencies). As a result, both parties
of a swap contract can adjust their portfolio position with the
minimum exchange risk. Practically, the operation of swaps
involves the FX market and the money market. Besides, it should
be noted that banks can still make a forward (outright) contract
in the swap market. In order to make a forward contract, one
swap contract and. one spot contract must be made. For instance,
if a bank wants to make a forward contract which is to sell HKD,
on the inter-bank level, the bank must sell HKD in spot and
commit a swap contract in the form of spot purchase of HKD and
sale of it at a specific day in the future. Besides, a swap
consists of two forward contracts delivered at different specific
22There are differences between a forward contract and a
swap contract. To begin with, their nature is different. The
swap transaction is equivalent to borrowing one currency against
pending another. There is not any position and involve no
exchange risk. On the other hand, forward contracts open a
position (long or short) and hence involve exchange risks.
Besides, a swap contract is dealt on the inter-bank level while
a forward contract, which serves traders, as well as hedgers, is
made on the customer-bank level.
13Normally, one-day, one-week, one-month, two-month, three-
month and six-month contracts are dealt.
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day in the future is not a normal practice.24 And, the rates of
swap reflect the market interest rates and the exchange risk
involved. 25
In comparison with the spot market, the swap market is less
active. The market has also grown substantially. For the period
December 1975- Marc 1980, the bank's outstanding forward
purchases of the foreign currencies, which amounted to US$64.6
26billion at the end of the period, increased twelve times`
c. Forecasts of Rates and Horizon-According to economic
theory, the exchange rates determination is subject to the law of
demand and supply. Hence, the forecasting of exchange rates is
based on the expectation on the future demand and supply of
currencies. Basically, the market expectations are formed from
the information set which consists of money supplies, trade
balances, interest rates, inflation rates and gold prices. Of
Course, the forecasts may be long term and short term. In the
dealing room of a bank, the forecast horizon is usually a few
minutes long. For foreign exchange dealers, it is meaningless
to forecast rates after one hour. They guess the rates by means
24If one wants to do a swap consists of two forward
contracts delivery at different specific future days, one can
also achieve this aim by means of the usual practice of swaps.
25 Practically, the following equation which is derived from
equation (2. 1) is used to calculate Swap Points (SP):
Sp Spot x No. of days x Interest rate differential
Foreign Currency interest rate x No. of days x 360
Outright (forward) prices= Spot price+ Swap points*
Negative and positive are sign for discount and premium to foreign
currency, respectively.
26bPhilip Haddon-Cave, (1980) op. cit., para. 56.
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of so-called 'market sentiment' which is believed to be formed
basing on the above mentioned information set. Sophisticated
models are useless in such situations. It should be stressed
that the unexpected news may affect the views on exchange rates
entirely and create a speculative sentiment in. the market. On
the other hand, some banks may have a research team to forecast
the exchange rates in the longer term such as one month or one
quarter. Some even build econometric models to forecast the
exchange rates.
d. Costs of Transaction-The major transaction costs for
foreign exchange dealings are the cost of labour, infra-structure
(installation of telecommunication equipments), transactions
documentations and brokerage, Here, we mention only the brokerage
fee in Hong Kong because other cost data are not available.
Before August 1982, Hong Kong's brokerage fee was the highest
among comparable financial centres such as London, New York,
Zurich, Tokyo and Singapore. At present, the brokerage fee is
lowered to HK$200 from HK$250 per million USD. This reduction of
brokerage follows the move of Singapore to cut down its brokerage
fee for foreign exchange dealings. Besides, the commission fee
for swap transactions is also reduced correspondingly. The
comparison of Hong Kong's brokerage is shown in Table 3.4. One
of the impacts of the higher brokerage fee is that banks are
increasingly making their foreign exchange transactions through
direct deals. At present, it is estimated that around 80 to 90
percent of the trading volume of foreign. exchange dealings is
done through direct deals. This may imply that the role played
by broker firms is less dominant in the Hong Kong market than in
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Table 5.4
Brokerage Comparison in the Leading Financial Centres
in 1-IKD ner million DSD)
Three-monthOne--weekOne-clay.
Marke Swap SwapSwapSpo
200.02 00.0 20,0 160.0Hong Kong
22 226.0226.0 180.08. 6Singapore
215.757.628.8Tokyo 143.8
67.7115. 3 1.1.5 67.7London




Note: On April 23, 1983, the exchange rates for each USD, Yelp,
BP, DM and Singapore dollars, are HK$ 6.79, 0.02875, 10.48,
2.77 and 3.23, respectively.
1982), p. 44.Sources: 1. Ryan




e. Discipline for the NIa.rket---The HKAB and the HKFXDBA do not
impose explicit regulations and guidelines for the participants in
the Hong Kong FX market. Basically, the whole market is completely
self-disciplined. All foreign exchange transactions done are
entirely based on their credit. Hence, it is very important
for one in the market to keep one's oi nn word on the contracts that
one has made. Otherwise, one will be eliminated from the market
due to one's misconduct. Within a financial institution, dealers
have the right to make foreign exchange dealings and the
institution monitors these transactions by means of (1) time of
the transaction done, (2) contract size, (3) rates and (4) docu-
mented by other department if it is an overnight transaction.
3.3 The significance of the Hong Kong Foreign Exchange I'viarket
In this section, we would like to investigate the role
played by the Hong Kong FX market in the arena of the world FX
market. Besides, the linkages between the market and other
financial markets such as gold markets and money markets, both
domestic and abroad, will be discussed.
3.3.1 The Importance of the Hong Kong FX Market
The Hong Kong FX market has its external and internal
function. Externally, the market, in fact, is integrated with
other FX markets in leading financial centres, namely, Singapore,
Tokyo, Frankfurt, Zurich, London, New York and San Francisco.
Hence the business of foreign exchange dealings operates con-
tinuously 24 hours a day over the world. In other words, the
Hong Kong FX market is a segment of the global FX market. With
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preference to the timing, the Hong Kong market opens just one hour
after the opening of the Tokyo market as well as after the closing
of the San Francisco market. This is clearly shown in Table 3.5.
Obviously, Hong Kong is located at an appropriate time zone. Thus,
other FX markets participants abroad can cover or hedge their
positions in the Hong'Kong market.
On the other hand, owing to Hong Kong's being the sixteenth
leading export countries, the FX market is vital to the growth
of external trade in Hong Kong. As a result, the growth of the
Hong Kong economy is dependent on the efficiency of FX market,
since Hong Kong's growth is generally export-led. 27 In 1982, the
external trade volume of Hong Kong is HK$165, 054 million which
is about 1.7 times of Hong Kong's GDP. Undoubtedly, such a large
export and import base contributes to the success of the Hong Kong
FX market. In addition the services provided by the FX market
also generate domestic income. What is more important is that the
competent and efficient Hong Kong FX market is a necessary
condition for Hong Kong to strengthen its status as one of the
leading financial centres in the world.
3.3.2 The Linkage between the Hong Kong FX Market and Other
Financial. Markets
Obviously, all financial markets are interdependent. -Here
we would like, however, to recapitulate only the linkages among
the FX market, the gold market and the money market, both domestic
and abroad.
Among gold markets, the activities of gold arbitrage, which
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usually involve FX markets, are alw,,rays in operation. In fact,
the gold arbitrage between the Hong Kong Gold and Silver Exchange
Society and the London gold market does involve the Hong Kong
FX market. The price of gold which is delivered in London (Loco
London) is quoted in -terms of IUD per troy ounce. Hong Kong
gold is traded in terms of HICD per tael. In order to illustrate
the relationship between the gold markets and the FX market,
we suppose that Hong Kong gold is at a premium of U.S. S.$1 over
London gold (of course, this premium is calculated on the basis
of the prevailing T.T. rate), such that the market price of
London gold is US$443.00-444.00, while that of Hong Kong gold,
by converting the Hang Kong gold price in HKD/tael to USD/troy
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ounce,28 is equivalent to 444.00-445.0 0. In this case, a London
gold trader would make a quotation, say 443.20-444.20, to induce
customers to sell gold to him. Suppose that he gets 2,000 troy
ounces from a customer at 443. 20 per troy ounce, then he (thea
gold trader) will hedge his position in the Hong Kong gold marke
by selling 1,700 ta.els (approximately equals 2,000 troy ounces) i
tt Hong Kong market at 4444.00. I t seems that he does not have
any position. Because the currencies involved in the above two
transactions are different, he must sell HH KD and buy USD at
prevailing market rates simultaneously, otherwise, the exposure
of the exchange risk in currency may deprive him of any profits
made in the gold arbitrage., However, the above procedures are
only part of the picture of the whole process of gold arbitrage.
ZBTi,ie formula for converting the Hong Kong gold price in.
H-3KD/t.aei to USD/troy ounce is as follows:
Hong Kong gold price./ 1.l913/ T.T.rate
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His position, in fact , is long in London gold and short in Hong
Kong gold . Later , he must square ( cover ) his positionin these
two markets. Hence , he needs to sell gold in London, then he
krill quote 442 . 80 - 443 . 80 to induce customersto buy gold from
him , assumingthat . the prevailingquotationis still 443 . 00 - 444 , 00 .
Once he sells 2 , 000 troy ouncesto a customerat 443 . 80 , he would
simultaneouslyb y 1 , 700 taels in Hong Kong ( assumingthat Hong
Kong gold is US $ 0 . 50 / troy ounce more expensivethan Londongold ,
i . e . 443 . 50 . 444 . 50 ) . At the sametime , he mustbuy HKD and sell .
USD so that he can pay the bill . From this whole process, he makes
profit at US $ 0 . 1 per troy ounce withoutrisk . It should be noted
that the loco London gold . market is a spot market ( settlement
two business days after the deal ) with delivery of gold in London
and paymentin USD in New York . On the other hand , the Hong Kong
gold market is , in effect , an undated futures market . This means
that is no fixed date of settlementwith respect to contract ' s
concluded. 29
The major gold arbitragers are the five major gold dealers
in London , namely , the Mocatta and Goldsmid, RothschildSon ,
Johnson Matthey , Samuel Montague and Sharps Pixtey , Besides ,
many large foreign banks , notably American banks are major
participantsof this market .
Other financial markets which link up with FX markets is
the money markets . The most notable relationshipbetween the
money markets and FX markets is interest , arbitrages between two
currencies, which link the money markets and FX markets together .
29 There is another type of gold arbitrage which need not
involve FX markets , that is , arbitrage between spot and forward
gold markets.
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The mechanism of the covered interest arbitrage has been discussed
in detail in chapter II . Here , we would like to mentiona few
interestingpoints . In general , the time period for interest
arbitrageon the inter - bank level is extremelyshort . It may be
one or two minutes long . Obviously, whether banks can gain
profits in interest arbitrages depends on their exchange dealers '
sentiment to the markets . This indicates that extra profits are
quickly eliminated . Besides , the formula used to calculate the
outrightprice is the same as equation( 2 . 1 ) , which is noted in
footnote25 .
To sum up , the linkagesamong the FX market , money market
and gold market make information flow smoothly across markets .
Any profit opportunitieswould be exploited by arbitration . Thus ,
the prices in different markets provide precise and actual
signal for allocation of the resources ( capital ) efficiently .
3 . 4 Present Problems and Future Prospects
Since 1972 , the Hong Kong FX market has grown substantially.
Thus , it seems that the market has no problem . However, owing
to the rapid growth of the market during the past years , the
shortage of trained foreign exchange professionals, both in the
managementand in the operationallevels is a major problem . At
present , there are about S 23 money and foreign exchangedealers /
brokers in Hong Kong . According to manpower survey conducted
by the Banking Training Board of Hong Kong Training Council , there
were 1 , 285 persons doing jobs involving foreign exchange business
in 1980 . 30 This was about 4 . 35 per cent of total employeesin
30 The First ManpowerSurvey , the Banking Training Board of
Hong Kong Training Council , Hong Kong GovernmentPrinter , 1982 ,
pp . 42 - 45 .
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the banking sector . 31 At the same time , the educationallevel of
the foreign exchange staff is lower than that of other staff
holding similar ranks in banks . Accordingto the survey , only
48 . 7 per cent of foreign exchangestaff at the supervisorylevel
held a university degree or some forms of professionalqualifica -
tions while 55 . 8 per cent of other employeesof the banking sector
at the rank had the same qualification. The same situation
applies to the managementl vel , 65 . 4 per cent of foreign exchange
professionalsat the management level held a university degree
or some forms of professionalqualificationswhile 74 . 9 per cent
of the employees of the whole sector held similar qualifications.
Hence , the labour shortage problem , whether in terms of quality
or quantity , has to be solved . Otherwise, it may hinder the
developmentof the market . 32
With regard to the future prospectsof the Hong Kong FX
market aside from the impacts of the 1997 problem , it is believed
that it will definitely have a satisfactorygrowth . This of
course implicitly assumes that the present financial crisis can be
resolved . Besides , the problem of labour shortage is not
difficult to tackle . This can be solved by providing training
programs ( courses ) to train more foreign exchange professionals.
What is more important is that the great volume of external trade
and also its rapid growth rate are the solid bases for Hong Kong ' s
being a leading FX market . In addition , the positive non -
31 Deposit - taking companiesand other banking - related
institutions were not included .
32 Some may argue that the political uncertaintyof Hong
Kong ' s future may adverselyaffect the developmentof the market .
However , this issue will not be discussedhere because of
insufficient supporting evidences .
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interventionismgovernment policy and the absence of exchange
control have made the Hong Kong FX market progress .
3 . S ConcludingRemarks
We have seen the developmentof the Hong Kong FX market .
The prosperityof the market starts from 1973 . At present , the
width and depth of the market is comparableto the markets in
any other leading financial centre . For example , it is believed
that the scale of the market is about the same magnitudeas that
of the Singaporemarket . However, the market as well as the
economy of Hong Kong are deterioratedby the 1997 problem . Once
this problem is solved , the prospect of the market will be very
bright . It is because Hong Kong has many fundamentalfavorable
factors , namely , well - establishedinfrastructure, efficient
communicationsystem , non - interventionismgovernment policy ,
sufficiently large external trade volume and the modernizationo :
China , which all boost the activity of the market .
From our previous discussion, the operation of the Hong
Kong FX market seems to work very well . Everyonecan know the
prevailing market prices quoted by broker firms . All other
relevant informationcomes from the Reuter , which can be obtainer
by all market participants. Thus , the process of information
flow does not have any problem. As a result , once there is a
profit opportunityin the market , it will be eliminatedquickly .
Therefore, the Hong Kong FX market seems to be highly efficient .
In other words , propositionone cannot be rejected .
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CHAPTERIV
THE INTEREST RATE PARITY TEST
This chapter is to investigatepropositiontwo - - market
participants ' behavior is consistent with the Efficient Market
Hypothesis( EMI - i ) . This can be achievedby means of examining
the Covered Interest Rate Parity ( CIRP ) . Basing on the empirical
results for the CIRP hypothesis, we may accept or reject pro -
position two . As noted in Chapter II , there are numerousstudies
on the topic of the CIRP . Basically , the empiricalresults are
consistentwith the CIRP . However, in some cases , the CIRP
hypothesis is rejected , especially for the internal pair of
assets denominated in different currencies . Although the CIRP
has been extensively investigated by many researchers , studies
on the CIRP involving HKD are rarely found . The purpose of this
chapter is to test the CIRP hypothesisfor two currencies, namely ,
USD and BP . The sample period is from January 1980 to February
1982. 1
4 . 1 The Covered Interest Rate Parity ( CIRP ) Hypothesis
The theory of CIRP hypothesizesthat the implicit interest
differential( forward premium or discount ) should be equal to the
interest rate differential. This is depictedin Fig . 4 . 1 . The
Althoughwe may find the three - month inter - bank rate for
HKD back up to March 1979 , we do not use this informationbefore
January 1980 because of inconsistencyof data .
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interest rate parity line is PP. In the presence of transaction
costs, all points (with regard to forward premium or discount
and interest rate differentials) would not fall exactly on the
PP line but on a band around the line PP.
Fig. 4.1 Interest Parity Line
In order to test the CIRP hypothesis, we adopt the following
standard CIRP test,2 which has been mentioned in Chapter II:3
(4.1)
Many empirical works on the CIRP adopted this form of
test, for example, Grubel (1966), Stoll (1968), Minot (1974) and
Cosandier and Lana (1981).
JIt should be noted that equation (4.1) is based on equation
(2. 1). And, throughout the rest of this paper, exchange rates are
defined as amount of HKD for one unit of foreign currency.
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Accordingto the CIRP , the intercept term a and the slope b should
be equal to zero and one , respectively. Besides , one additional
hypothesisderived from the CIRP can also be tested . Suppose
there is an arbitrage margin opened by speculators . Arbitragers
would exploit this profit opportunity by shifting their funds
from one centre to an other and close the arbitrage margin . As
a result , if the CIRP holds , the following additional hypothesis
should not be rejected . That is , the arbitrage margin 4 should
not be , on the average , significantlydifferent from zero .
Before leaving this section , we want to point out that we
shall use the Ordinary Least Squares ( OLS ) regression analysis
to test the hypotheses. As the technique is standardizedand
well - known , there is no need to discussit here .
4 . 2 Data Considerations
In accordancewith the CIRP , the pair of securitiesused
in testing the CIRP should have the same degree of risk and
their maturity should match that of the forward exchange contract .
At the same time , the data used for the hypothesistesting should
fulfill the following requirement: the set of interest rates
for securities , spot exchange rate and forward exchange rate
should be quoted simultaneously. We should use the set of data
which faced exactly by internationalinvestors at the same moment
of time . For the purposehere , we utilize one - month , three - month
and six - month Eurodollarmarket deposits rates for the USD and
the BP inter - bank rates in the Hong Kong money market for the
HKD . All interest rates and forward discount or premium are
The arbitragemargin is defined in p . 78 .
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expressedin per cent per month , per quarter , and per six month
for one - month , three - month , and six - month maturity, respectively.
There are 529 daily observationsduring the sample period . With
regard to other questionson data and source of data , they are
given in the AppendixIII .
4 . 3 EmpiricalResultsfor the Test on the CIRP fly . othesi s
The estimationresults for equation( 4 . 1 ) using the data
for two currencies, USD and BP , and for the three types of
maturities, namely, one - month , three - month , and six - month are
presentedin Table 4 . 1 . Out of six cases ( currency- maturity
episodes ) , five of the intercepts are statistically significant
different from zero , though one is marginally significant at the
10 % level . For the slopes , four of them are significantly
differentfrom their exT ected value of one at the 1 % level . In
fact , the CIRP test is a joint test for the hypothesisthat the
interceptis equal to zero and the slope is equal to unity . Thus ,
the F statistics for the joint test on the hypothesisare also
shown in Table 4 . 1 . All the F statisticsfor the USD are statis -
tically significantat the I % level and hence the hypothesisfor
the USD is rejected. On the contrary, there is only one case of
the BP , six - month maturity, in which the CIRP hypothesisis
rejected. The level of significanceis at the 1 % level . There -
fore , we cannot reject the CIRP hypothesisfor the case of the
BP as a whole . In other words , the CIRP does not hold true for
the USD and seems to work well for the BP except for the case of
the six - month maturity for the period in question . Although the
CIRP does not work as predictedby the theory for the cases of
the USD , the interest rate differentialis still a crucial
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Table 4.1
Standard Interest Rate Parity Test
(Ft+s t -St)/St =a+b
i-i*
l+i* + t
Currency Maturity Period Intercept(a) Slope (b) R2 F DW DF
1-month 80/1-82/2
-0.000396 c1 0.810373 c1 0.5477 37.7840 c1 1.0244 0.4876 527(0.000053) (0.032079)
3-month 80/1-82/2
-0.000502 c1 0.886164 c1
0.7816 26.9475 c1 0.7919 0.3030 527
(0.000079) (0.020408)
6-month 80/1-82/2
-0.00805 c1 0.895439 c1
0.7369 18.8363 c1 0.9091 0.5449 527
1-month 80/1-82/2
(0.000140) (0.023305)
-0.000129 c10 1.009883 0.8513 2.1841 1.3236 0.3378 527(0.000067) (0.018384)
3-month 80/1-82/2
0.000088 0.998475
0.9502 0.4486 1.0147 0.4926 527(0.000096) (0.009954)
6-month 80/1-82/2
-0.000392 c5 0.973820 c1
0.9490 6.3969 c1 0.8668 0.5662 527(0.000157) (0.009833)
USD
BP
Note: 1.E(a)=0 and E (b)=1.
2.F-statistic is to test jointly a=0 and b=1
3.c1, c5 and c10 are the level of significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectvely
4. is first order autocorrelation coefficient
5. DF denotes degrees of freedom
6. Figures is parenteses are standard errors of the estimtes.
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explanatory variable to explain the relationship between forward
exchange rates and spot exchange rates for the USD . Interest
rate differentials almost explain this relationship for the BP
as expected . The assertions are supported by the following
evidences : all t statistics for testing the hypothesis that the
slope is zero are significantt the 1 % level . 5 At the same time ,
as noted before , that five of the intercepts are significantly
different from zero , which , we believe , is largely due to transac -
tion costs . This may imply that all . observationswill fall within
a band around the interest rate parity line even if the CIRP
holds , which was suggestedby Frenkel and Levich ( 1977 ) as well
as Levich ( 1979 a ) . It is interestingto note that the interest
rate differentials always overestimate the forward premium or
discountexcept for the case of one - month maturityof the BP .
These results are similar to those of Grubel ( 1966 ) . 6
In addition , our empirical results are consistent with
Fig . 4 . 2 . to Fig . 4 . 7 whichare diagramsof plot of forward
premium ( discount ) against interest rate differentials for
different maturitiesof the USD and the BP . It must be aware
that they are indicativeand not conclusive. We can see that
the diagramsfor the BP are very much the same as Fig . 4 . 1 and
nearly all observationsfall on the narrow band around the
interest rate parity line PP . It is believed that the deviations
from the interest rate parity line can be explained by transac -
tion costs . However , with regard to USD ' s diagrams, observations
5 Althought ese t - statisticsare not shown in Table 4 . 1
they can be easily computedfrom the estimatesin the table .
6 Grubel( 1966) , p . 88 .
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Fig. 4, 2
Plot of the One-month Forward Premium (Discount) against the
One-month Interest Differential, HKD vs USD
0.60
0.40
Note: 1. The PP line is the interest rate parity line.
2. The premium (discount) and interest differential are expressed in per cent per month.












plot of the Three-month Forward Premium (Discount) against











Note: 1. The PP line is the onterest rate parity line.
2. premium (discount) and interest differential are expressed in per cent per quarter
3. 205 observations are hidden out of a total of 529 observations.
Interent differential
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Plot of the Six-month-Forward Premium (Discount) against
the Six-month Interest Differential, HKD vs USD
Forward Premium(D:scnunt)
Note: 1. The PP line is the interest rate parity line.
2. The premium (discount) and interest differential are expressed in per cent per six month.

















Plot of the One-month Forward Premium (Discount) against
the One-month Interest Differential, HKD vs BP
Forward Premium(Discount)
Note: I. The PP line is the interest rate parity line.
2. The premium (discount) and interest differential are expressed in per cent per month.




















Plot of the Three-month Forward Premium (Discount) against
















Note: 1. The PP line is the interest rate parity line.
2. The premium (discount) and interest differential are exprssed in per cent per quarter.
3. 211 observations are hidden out of a total of 529 obervations.
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Fig. 4.7
Plot of the Six-month Forward Premium (Discount) against
the Six-month Interest Differential, HKD vs BP
Note: 1. The PP line is the interest rate parity line.
2. The premium (discount) and interest differential are expressed in per cent per six month.












deviate very much from the PP line . It seems that transaction
costs are unable to explain the deviations from the parity line
for the cases of the USD . This point will be elaboratedin detail
in Section4 . 4 .
Now let us return to the limitationson our statistical
results . It has been noted that the values of Durbin - Watson ( DW )
statistics are low . This implies that there exists serial
correlationin the random disturbanceterms . 7 Besides , the
first order autocorrelationseems to be high . As a result , it
is doubtfulto use the F - and t - tests . B However, the serial
correlationmay not influence our basic findings . 9 It is because
the standard error of the estimates could not be much larger and
yet the coefficients remain statistically significant different
from their expectedvalue except for the BP in one - month and
three - month maturity . 10 The presence of autocorrelationmay
imply that there may be a misspecificationin the standard CIRP
test . In other words , this may indicate that the standardCI RP
formulation misses some explanatory variables in some cases and
7 These results are very much similar to those of Stoll .
( 1968 ) , Grubel( 1966 ) , and Cosandierand Lang ( 1981 ) ' s case of
internal pair of assets .
8 For detail discussion on the consequencesof the presence
of autocorrelateddisturbanceson F - and t - tests , see Johntson
( 1972) , Chapter8 , pp . 246 - 249 .
9 We have estimatedthe coefficientsby means of the
generalizedleast squares method . It is discovered that the
coefficients move further from their expected value . However ,
these estimation results do not have any significant effect
on our previous findings of the CIRP test . It should be noted
that the autoregressivescheme for the random term is assumed
to be first orderi . e . Ut = pU t - 1 + wt wherep is the
first order autocorrelationcoefficient and wt is independent
disturbance term obey usual assumptions.
10 A similar argumentis also suggestedby Grubel ( 1966 ) ,
Chapter10 , p . 89 .
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cannot be generally applied to all situations . According to the
Modern Theory , 11 speculatorsalso play an important role in
forward exchange rates determination. Thus this may imply that
there are some flaws in the CIRP . 12 The standardCIRP leaves out
the role of speculators. Therefore, if there is a persistent
speculative sentiment for speculators in the foreign exchange
market over time , the CIRP is bound to fail . We have found that ,
accordingto our empirical results , the CIRP did not hold true
for the USD for all maturity structureand the BP for six - month
maturity. We believe that the CIRP does not work well in the USD ,
which is partly due to the persistent speculative sentiment and
partly due to the limited arbitrage funds . It means that the
schedule for demand and supply of forward exchange contract of
speculatorsare highly elastic and that of arbitragers is not
perfectly elastic . In accordancewith our findings for the inter -
views presented in Chapter III , there was a persistent speculative
sentimentover time in the Hong Kong foreign exchange( FX ) r tarket ,
especiallyfor the segmentof T . T . market , during the sample
period . It is because there was a rapid increase in the number
of DTCs , 13 and the operationsof DTCs , in general, were more
speculativeand aggressive . What is more important is that DTCs
always participatedactively in the T . T . market in Hong Kong .
For a lucid and rigorous treatmentof the Modern lheory ,
for example, see Grubel( 1966 ) and Stoll ( 1968 ) .
12 The CIRP assumes that arbitragersare risk neutral or
arbitrage funds are not limited so that speculatorsdo nothing
in determiningforward exchange rates . In accordance with the
Modern Theory , the assumptionsare unrealistic .
10 There were 302 , 350 , and 358 DTCs in Hong Kong in 1980 ,
1981 , and 1982 ( at the end of June ) , respectively.
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The reason is that it is relatively difficult for them to join
other currency market segments because they seldom had credit
lines outsides Hong Kong. In addition, since the supply of HKD
is limited relative to the USD, the insufficient arbitrage
funds is another probable reason for the failure of the CIRP
with respect to the USD. On the whole, the persistent speculative
sentiment as well as the limited arbitrage funds are the most
probable causes for the deviations from the CIRP for the USD in
the Hong Kong FX market. On the contrary, the market for the
BP is much less speculative. Besides, the supply of arbitrage
funds of HKD seems to be enough relative to that of BP. Therefore,
the CIRP works well for one-month and three-month maturity cases.
However, that the CIRP does not work well for the six-month
maturity of BP may be due to transaction costs, in addition to
the particular behavior of arbitragers and speculators with
respect to the six-month maturity for the BP.
4.4 The Nature of Arbitrage Margins
In this section, we examine the additional hypothesis
concerning the actual arbitrage margins, that is, the arbitrage
margin should not be, on the average, significantly different
from zero. Now let us first define the actual arbitrage margin
as:
(4.2)
where Am t is the actual margin at time t.
Table 4.2 shows the mean of arbitrage margin for arbitrage
between HKD and USD as well as between HKD and BP for the whole
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Mean Arbitrage Margin
Period No. of HKD-- USD HKD-- BP
Observations
1-month 3-month 6-month 1-month 3-month 6-month
80/01 22 -0.04750 -0.0820a -0.0603b -0.0794a -0.1123a -0.1679a
80/02 19 -0.0079 0.0719 0.1103 -0.0105 0.0228 -0.1499
80/03 20 -0.0433 -0.0636 -0.1784b -0.0261 0.1273b -0.5628a
80/04 19 -0.05240 -0.0268 -0.0812 -0.0022 0.0011 -0.0818
80/05 22 -0.0219 0.0304 0.1446b -0.0109 0.0398 0.1343
80/06 20 0.0067 0.0669b 0.1113b -0.0314 0.0500 0.1592b
80/07 22 -0.0703b -0.0554 -0.0303 -0.0743a -0.0861b -0.0451
80/08 19 -0.0541a -0.0354c -0.1514a -0.0780a -0.04750 -0.1521a
80/09 21 -0.0356b -0.0134 -0.0043 -0.0130 0.1089a 0.0414
80/10 22 -0.0195 -0.0246 -0.12690 -0.0221 -0.0045 -0.0370
80/11 20 -0.0872a -0.2436a -0.4278a 0.0075 -0.0618 -0.1731
80/12 21 -0.0375 0.0587 0.100050 0.0789b 0.0952a 0.0240b
81/01 21 -0.1035a -0.1208a -0.1142c -0.0454 -0.0278 -0.0595
Table 4.2
Mean Arbitrage Margins for Arbitrages between HKD and USD as well as between HKD and BP
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Table 4.2 (continued)
Mean Arbitrage Margins for Arbitrages between HKD and USD as well as between HKD and BP
Mean Arbitrage Margin
Period No. of HKD-- USD HKD-- BP
Observations
1-month 3-month 6-month 1-month 3-month 6-month
81/02 18 -0.0581b -0.1124b -0.1791b -0.0543b -0.0177 0.0168
81/03 22 -0.0644b -0.1166a 0.0047 -0.0098 -0.0806 -0.0340
81/04 18 -0.0139 -0.0440 -0.1396b -0.0171 0.07920 0.0094
81/05 21 0,0109 0.0907 -0.1580c 0.0834a 0.2032a -0.1501b
81/06 22 0.0097 -0.0062 -0.0478 0.0196 0.0647b 0.0003
81/07 21 -0.0828a -0.2001a -0.0828c -0.0753a -0.1485a -0.0759
81/08 19 -0.1390a -0.0734b -0.1435a -0.1087a 0.0117 -0.0362
81/09 21 -0.0517a -0.0633 -0.0866 -0.1207a -0.1037c -0.1614c
81/10 21 -0.02464 -0.0269 -0.0118 0.0596 0.0801 0.1134
81/11 21 0.0831a -0.0229 -0.1154 0.0699a 0.0186 -0.2034b
81/12 22 0.0428b -0.0080 0.0399 0.0725a 0.0674c 0.1312b
82/01 17 -0.0412c 0.0539b 0.27394 -0.0223 0.1736a 0.3982
82/02 18 0.0246 0.0404 0.0307 0.0480 0.1202 0.1018
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Table 4.2 (continued)





HKD -- USD HK -- BP

















Notes: 1. a, b and c stand for the estimates are significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively
2. The figures are expressed in per cent per month, per quarter and per six month for one-month,
three-,pmtj and six-monthmaturity, respectively.
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sample period and different sub-periods. For the whole period
January 1980- February 1982, all the means of arbitrage margins
of the USD for. any maturity are significantly different from
zero at the 1% level. On the other hand, not all those BP for
different maturity differ from zero statistically, although two
of them significantly different from zero at the 5% level for the
cases of one-month and six-month maturity. Besides, the mean of
arbitrage margin for the USD is much greater than that for the
BP. It should be noted that although the arbitrage margin is
significantly different from Zero in two cases for the BP, the
value is too small to have economic signnificance. Furthermore,
the break down of the whole period into three sub-periods, namely,
January 1980- December 1980, January 1981- December 1981, and
January 1952- February 1982 does not change the results. Out of
nine period-maturity episodes, eight episodes are statistically
significant different from zero for the arbitrage margin between
HKD and US D only four episodes are significantly different
from zero at the predetermined level of significance for the
arbitrage margin between HKD and BP. Of course, if we further
break down sub-periods into each month, no change can be made for
our basic conclusion, that is, the additional hypothesis that
the arbitrage margin should not be significantly different from
zero, in general, holds true for the BP and not for the USD.
It is consistent with our previous Con cl.usiorn in the last section.
Finally, the Mean of the Absolute Value of Arbitrage Margin
(MAV 1) is worth investigating because it is closely related to
transaction costs of interest arbitrages. The results for the
MAVAN between 1TSD and HKD as well as between BP and HKD are shown
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Table 4.3









80/01-82/02 529 0.0887 0.1364 0.2225 0.0999 0.1606 0.2641
80/01-80/12 247 0.0918
0.1323 0.2272 0.1040 0.1522 0.2686
81/01-81/12 247 0.0885 0.1459 0.2208 0.0985 0.1689 0.2556
82/01-82/02 35 0.0685
0.0986 0,2012 0.0810 0.1614 0.2914
Note
The figures are expressed in per cent per mont per quarter and per six month for one-month, three-month
and six-month maturity, respectively.
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in Table 4. 3. We note from Table 4.3 that the NIAVANI of the USD
is less than that of the BP indicating that the transaction costs
for arbitrage between USD and HKD are less than that between BP
and H:KU.14. These results are unexpected. According to the
previous conclusion that the CIRP, in general, holds true for
the BP but not for the USD, the transaction costs of the BP should
not be higher than those of the USD. However, these results are
easily i.,nderstood. As noted in Chapter III, all exchange rates
are quoted in terms of USD. In other words, the exchange rate
for the BP in terms of HKD is a cross rate. 'h,erefore, the
transaction costs of the BP have to be higher than those of the
USD because the arbitrage be nwween HIED and BP involves six
transactions while the arbitrage between HKD and USD involves
only four stransactions15 Undoubtedly, if the MAVAM of the BP is
entirely attributed to transaction costs, then the transaction
costs for the whole interest arbitrage ope_ration for the USD is
two-third. of the MIJAVAM for the BP on. the assumption that the cost
of each transaction is almost equal. As a result, we find that
the magnitude of deviations from the CIRP for the USD can only
14 Branson (1969) attributed any deviations from interest
rate parity line to transaction costs for arbitrages provided that
the CIRP holds, i.e. transaction costs equals the MAVAMI.
IbGenerally, a covered interest arbitrage operation involves
four transactions. More specifically, a covered arbitrage out-
flow involves the following- transact ions in a direct rate dealing:
(1) sales of domestic securities, (2) spot purchase of foreign,
currency, (3) purchase of foreign securities and (4) forward.
sales of foreign currency. For triangle (corns rate) interest
arbitrages, two more transactions are necessary, that is, purchase
and sales of the medium currency (i.e. USD). As a result, the
costs of interest arbitrage for the USD is two-third of MAVAMM of
the BP provided that the transaction costs are the same for all
currencies.
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be explained partly by transaction costs. This may imply that
the deviation from the CIRP is not mainly due to transaction.
costs. It further confirms our previous findings that there is
a misspeci fi cation in the standard CI RP test for the pair of
US D4HIK.
4.5 Conclusion
We have investigated the CIRP hypothesis as well as the
additional hypothesis. We foLn.d, that the CIRP hypothesis was
rejected for all the cases of the USD and could not be rejected
for the BP except for the case of six-month mature ty. In other
words, the CIR.P worked. well, for the BP as a whole and has poor
performance for tie USD during the sample period. However, it
does not say that interest rate differentials take no part in
explaining the relation between forward exchange rates and spot
exchange rates in the case of the USD. It is still an important
determinant of forward exchange rates.
Because of the presence of the autocorrelation of the
residual terms, it is believed that. the CIRP leaves out some
explanatory variables. Based on the previous discussion, it seems
that the CIRP does not take into account the role played by
speculators as well as the unrealistic assumption of unlimited
arbitrage fi.mds for the case of USD. For the case of BP, it
seems CIRP does not miss any important variables. The failure of
the CIRP for the cases of USD may he due to the persistent
speculative sentiment over time in addition to the limited
arbitrage funds. This assertion is further confirmed by the
fact that the deviations from the CI: RP cannot be explained
entirely by transaction costs. On the other hand, the failure
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for the case of six-month of BP mainly arises from transaction
costs as well as the particular behavior of arbitragers in the
six-month maturity for the BP.
Besides, arbitragers play a dominant role in the CIRP for
the case of BP. It is because once there is an arbitrage margin
opened by specula tor.s, the margin will be closed by arbitragers.
his is supported by the: a.ct that the arbitrage margins are not,
on the average, significantly di.f.. ferent from/ er.o for the RP
case. However, it should be noted. that, although the ClRP fails
in the cases of USD, the role played by arbitragers cannot be
neglected. in other words, the determination. of forward rates
is influenced by both the behavior of speculators and arbitragers.
With regard to proposition two, since the CIRP hypothesis
holds true for the BP and hence there is not any unexploited
profit opportunity, this is consistent with proposition two. On
the other hand, it seems that the failure of the CIRP hypothesis
for the USD indicates the existence of u exploited. opportunities.
In fact, these unexploited profit opportunities, which may be
accounted by some left-out explanatory variables, do not exist.
It is because one probable reason to account for the failure of
the CIFP is limited arbitrage funds of HKD. This may view as the
imperfection of the market. However, it is still consistent with
the EiII, since the market inerfection is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for the rejection of the E?+I. Thus, we
cannot reject proposition two.
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CHAPTER V
TIlE MARKET EFFICIENCY FOR ThE HUNG KONG
FOREIGN E XCHANGGE MARKET
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate proposition
three--market prices fully reflect all. available information for
the market. In other words, we investigate the market efficiency
for the LSD and the BP in the Hong Kong foreign exchange (FX)
market in accordance with the term nology of Fana (1970). There
are three levels of market efficiency with respect to three
different sets of information. This has been noted in Chapter H.
Generally, the semi-strong-form as well as strong-form market
efficiency test are seldomly conducted and the weak-form Efficient
Market Hypothesis (E H) tests are widely used because of data
availability. Here, we are going to examine the weak--form EMH.
The sample covers the period January 1979 to J T11e 1982.1
5 .1 Considerations of the Operational Framework any Data for
the EMH Tests2
To examine the market efficiency for the Hong Kong FX
market, we use equation (2.8), (2.1.2) and (2.13). As we have
Tie sample period for the empirical tests in tII s chapter
is longer than that in Chapter IV because the tests do not
involve data for interest rates.
The discussion is confined to the tests which are actually
conducted in our study.
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discussed the tests in detail. In Chapter II, there is no need to
give my further illustration. However, we would like to restat
1. the random walk test (equation (2.8))
(5.1)




In what follows, a word about data for the EN-I test will be
given. In fact, we will conduct two types of weak-form ENE
tests. With regard to the weak-form E:h test based on the random
walk model-equation (5.1), we may use daily spot exchange rates
for the sample period. 'here are a total of 859 observations.
However, it is improper to utilize daily data to estimate
equation (5.2) and (5.3) for testing the ENE. This is because
serial correlations in the residual terms of the equation are
induced by using overlapping daily data, Hence, we use non-
overlapping one-month, two-month, and three-month. data for three
different maturities, namely, one-month, two-month, and three-.
month. The samples are randomly selected from the period January
1979 - June 1982. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that we
would like to use Ordinary, Least Squares (OLS) method for estimating
3
For data. source, see Appendix III
them for the sake of compleness
1nSt - 1nSt-s Ut
InSt
Ftt-s +Vt
1nSt Ftt-s + Y1nFt-s t-2s +Vt
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the regressions.
5.2 Empirical Results for the Efficient Market Hypothesis
(EMI) Tests
The empirical. results based on equation (5.3)
will be presented in the following sections.
5.2.1 The Random Walk Model Test
The autocorrelation coefficient for one to twenty-four
lag(s) of the first difference in the logarithmic daily spot
exchange rates series (i.e. Ut= 1nSt- 1TnS-t , where the subs-
t
cript s=i (day)) are shown in Table 5.1. For the case of USD,
four of twenty-four autocorrelations are, significantly different
from zero, although one of them is marginally significant at the
10% level. And, the Box-Pierce Q statistic 4 which is used. to
test the overall randomness of the series {Ut} for 8, 16, 24
lags are calculated. Most rsrortanti y, two of the three
statistics are statistic ally significant so that the series seems
to be non-white. As a. result, we may conclude that the USD
market is inefficient in the weak-form sense.
For the case of BP, the results are very similar with
those of USD. Six of twenty-four autocorr.elation coefficients
are significantly different from zero, although five of them are
marginally significant at the 10% level. Besides, the Box-Pierce
4Box-Pierce (19 0) defined the statistic Q composed of the
first k residual auto corrc1ations p1, p2
where N is number of observations. This statistic approximately





Sample Autocorrelation of Daily Log--Spot Rates for Different Lags (=1, 2, ...24)Lag
Currency
Lag
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-0.0202 -0.0348 0.0039 0.0499 -0.0125 37.89a1
BP 0.0286
0.0041 -0.0030 0.0465
-0.0424 -0.384 -0.0579a10 0.0113 27.89
Note
a1 represents significant test at 1% level.
a5 represents significant test at 5% level.
a10 represents significant test at 10% level.
b The Box-Pierce (1970) QStatistio
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Q statistic for 8 lags is significant at the 10% level. Under
such circumstances, it seems that the series for the BP is non-
random. This inTlies that the market for the BP also seems weak.-
form inefficient.
5.2.2 The Test for Market Efficiency and For-.ward Rates as
Unbiased Predictors of Future Spot Rates
The estimation results of equation (5.2) and (5.3) are
presented in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 for the USE) and the BP by
using three types of i aturityt data (one-month, two-month, and
three-month), respectively.5 Now let us first consider the case
of USD. From the empirical results of equation (5.2), we find
that the intercepts and the slopes do not differ from zero and
amity even at the 10% level, respectively, for the three types
of maturity. Besides, the joint hypothesis that the intercept is
zero and the slope is unity cannot be rejected because of the
insignificance of F statistics for all examined m:iaturities. 6
This indicates that forward rates are unbiased predictors for
future spot rates. It is interesting to notice that the forward
exchange rate tends to over-estimate the future spot rates for
any maturity. Besides, when we examine the auto correlations up
to 4 lags., we find that no autocorrelation of any order is
significantly different from zero at the predetermined level of
significance except for the case of one-month maturity. With
5 For empirical tests, the subscripts in equation (5.2) and
(5.3) equals one, two and three month for one-month, two-month,
and three-month maturity, respectively.
6 It should be noted that some doubt may be thrown on the




Market Efficiency and Forward Rate as Unbiased Predictors of Future Spot Rates --USD
ln St = ln Ft t-s +Vt/ ln St= ln Ft t-s + ln Ft-s t-2s +Vt
Maturity R2 F DF DW
=1 2 3 4
1-month
0.183377 0.971629
0.9289 1.9289 38 1.3283 0.3186 a5 -0.2020 -0.1432 0.1016(0.269403) (0.043001)
1-month
0.247734 1.285111 a10 -0.323985 a10
0.9339 37 1.6450 0.1343(0.261862) (0.164867) (0.164913)
2-month
0.581307 0.908665
0.8070 1.3135 17 2.1584 -0.1165 0.3471 0.1244 -0.1234(0.651434) (0.104052)
2-month
0.447794 0.750044 0.180234
0.8011 16 1.7562 0.0777(0.688037) (0.249078) (0.256241)
3-month
0.560078 0.912720




0.6711 9 1.9648 0.0154(1.230940) (0.330607) (0.341379)
Note: 1. E( )=0, E( )=1 and E( )=0.
2. a5 and a10 are the level of significance at 5% and 10%, respectively.
3. F denotes F statistic for testing the joint hypothesis that =0 and =1
4. denotes the autocorrelation coefficient of order
5. Figures in parentheses are standard errors of the estimates.
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respect to the one-month maturity, the first order autocorrelation
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5% level.
Besides, no higher order autocorrelation exists. In order to further
explore the implications of market efficiency, we include one more
t-s
lagged variable of forward rates, Inl= t- 2s, into equation (5.2)
which is exactly equation (5.3). w e find that the adjusted R has
improved slightly and the first-order autocorrelation seems to be
eliminated as judged from the DIV test of the one-month Maturity.
Besides, the coefficient of lnFt 2s IS significantly different from
zero at the 10% level. On the contrary, the adjusted declines
zero at is included in equatIon (S.2when the lagged ariable, InFt-s t-2s
As a result, it seems to us that the market for LJSD is weak-form
inefficient for ore-month maturity Case while it is weak-form
efficient for the cases of two-month and three--month maturity.
On the other hand, with regard to the case of BP, it is
found that all intercepts and slopes are significantly different
from zero and unity at the predetermined level of significance,
respectively, for three different maturities. However, when we
examine the F statistics for testing the joint hypothesis that the
intercept is zero and the slope is unity, two of the three
statistics are marginally significant at the 10% level. This seems
to indicate that the hypothesis that forward rates are unbiased
predictors for future spot rates is rejected marginally for the
cases of one-month and two-month maturity7 but not for the three-
month maturity case. Besides, it is found that the degree of
predictability of forward rates as forecasts for future spot rates




Market Efficiency and Forward Rates as Unbiased Predictors of Future Spot Rates--BP
ln St= ln Ft t-s +Vt/ ln St = ln Ft t-s + ln Ft t-2s +Vt
Maturity R2 F DF DW
p(t)
=1 2 3 4
0.417789 a5 0.827480 a5
l-month (0.171566) (0.071335) 0.7740 3.1700 a10 38 1.1978 0.3991 a5 0.0192 0.0448 0.1300
0.483799 a1 1.175313 -0.375473 a5
l-month
(0.162290) (0.151215) (0.146534)
0.8029 37 1.7259 0.1289
0.968702 a5 0.599396 a5
2-month
(0.406990) (0.168936) 0.3917 2.8900 a10 17 1.6000 0.2626 0.1814 0.0508 -0.2018
1.059547 a5 0.760517 -0.199151
2-month
(0.423271) (0.250517) (0.230219) 0.3825 16 1.8147 0.0751
1.460764 a10 0.395375 a10
3-month (0.729806) (0.302222)




0.0412 9 1.5298 0.1189
Note: 1. E( )=0, B( )=1, and E( )=0
2.a1, a5 and a10 are the levlel of significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
3.F denotes F satatistic of testing the joint hypothesis that =0 and =1
4. p( ) denotes the autocorrelation coefficient of order .
5.Figures in Parentheses are standard eeors of estmates.
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(in terms of standard error of estimates) for the USD is much higher
than that for the BP. Now we turn to the issue of the EMH. We
find that the empirical results are very much the same as those of
USD. That is, the market is weak-form inefficient when one-month
data are used, but it is weak-form efficient when two-month and
three-month data are used.
S.3 Conclusion
We have examined the ENII for the USD and the BP markets by
using one-month, two-month, and three-month data. Also, the
biasedness of forward rates as predictors for future spot rates has
been investigated. On the whole, we found that forward rates were
unbiased forecasts of future spot rates except for the BP of one-
month and two-month maturity cases for the sample in question. In
addition, it seems that the predictability of forward rates for
the USD is higher than that for the BP. In what follows, we shall
make some remarks on the empirical results of the EMH-I test.
On the one hand, it was found that both markets for the USD
and the BP were inefficient in the weak-form sense when the data
used for the empirical tests were either daily or one-month data.
On the other hand, both markets for the USD and the BP were found
to be weak-form efficient when we used two-month and three-month
data. However, if the market is found to be inefficient when
daily or one-rionth data are used for the EMH test, it should also
be inefficient when two-month or three-month data are used.
Therefore, it seems that there is an inconsistency among our
empirical results. In fact, the spurious inconsistency does dis-
appear when the information diffusion process in a market is
considered. Practically, the square of the au.tocorrelation can be
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treated as a measure of the information for the residual at time t
carried. by the residual at time t-l. Hence, although the true
autocorrelation is nonzero, it may be too small to carry information
from time t- l to time t.
Therefore, it is probable that the information carried by the
autocorrelation will be digested for longer period. Thus the auto-
correlation of one lag (the lag with longer period) may be negligible
However, it seems to us that there is still a puzzle why the market
is inefficient when one-month data are used for the EMi-l test whereas
the market is efficient when two-month or three-month data are used.
That is, the problem that the information is not digested for one-
month periods (i.e. the residual at time t-l carrys some information
at time t) v hile this information is digest d for two--moth and
three-month periods is still unsolved. This puzzle may be solved
when we consider the fact that there is a time lag between the
compilation of the statistics such as money supplies, trade balances
and inflation rates and the release of this information. And, the
time lag is usually longer than one month. Thus, it is possible
that some may access this information to form their expectations on
exchange rates before the information is released publicly. As a
result, the one-month case seems inefficient. On the contrary, the
above situation does not hap-pen to the two-month and three-month
cases since all. the relevant information is known. by all market
participants. Hence, when' we examined the EMH by using two-month
and three-m.on.th data, we may tend to conclude that the market is
efficient.
8Fama (1976) called it proportion of variance explained.
To view the issue in detail., see Farna (197/6), p. 147.
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From our previous discussion, the acceptance or rejection of
the EMH seems to be subjected to what kind of data are used, that is,
whether it is short: run data or long run data. 'T'here is a tendency
to reject the EMFi when short run data. are used to accept the EMH
when longer term data are used.
On the whole, we may come to a conclusion that the FX markets
for the USD and the BP in Hong song seem to be weak-form inefficient
for the sample in question empirically. This is because the EMI-I
is rejected in the weak-form sense both for the IJSD and the BP when
daily data or one-month data are used in the EMHH tests. However,
when we examine the autocorrelation coefficients in Table 5.1, we
find that they are very small both in magnitude and in terms of
proportion of variance explained.
Hence, the residual term at time t-1. does not c,.r-ry much
information for the residual at time t. Thus no one can use this
little information to make profit. It appears that the market
is efficient is a reasonable description of the real world from




ITHE TIME SERIES BEHAVIOR AND FORECASTING
MODELS OAF E XCHA GE RATE S
The. purposes of this chapter are twofold. The first one
is to describe the time series behavior of exchange rates of [JSD
and BP over t. e by means of descriptive statistics. The second
one is to evaluate proposition three----market prices fully reflect
all availabie 1_nforrnatioli by the examination on the three exchange
rate forecasting models, namely, the random,, walk (lagged spot)
model, the Fisher parity model. and the forward rate model. The
sample periods for the first issue and the second issue are
January 19 7 9- June 1982 and January 1980- February 1982,1 res-
pectively.
6 .1 Overall View onExchange Rates over Time
For the sake of convenience, we transform the original.
exchange rate series into a series {Xit} such that the first
observation of the series is equal to 100. More specifically, the
series {X',. 1 can be written as:
(6.'
'The sample period for the evaluation of forecasting models
is consistent with that in Chapter IV. It is because it




where Xit is the exchange rate of currency i at time t. The
transformed series of spot rates of f SD and BP over time is shown
in Fig. 6.1 respectively. The plots of spot rate's with the three--
month forward rates of USD and. BP are shown in Fig. 6.7 and Fig.
6.3, respectively. These diagrams exhibit that both the exchange
rates of USD and BP fluctuates widely. It is obvious that the
USD displays a rising trend during the whole period while the BP
exhibits a rising trend before 1981 and then declines thereafter.
Table 6.1. presents the minimum, maximum, and ending values for
forward and spot rates. We find that the spot rates of USD and
BP appreciate relative to the HKD by about 23% and 6%, respectivel
for the entire sample period.
Besides, Table 6.2 displays the mean and standard deviation
of spot and forward rates of the USD and the BP. It is found
that the standard deviation of the USD is greater than that of
the BP for the whole Period. On the contrary, the result is
reversed when we break. down the entire period into four sub-period
In general., standard deviation for the BP are greater than those
for the USD. This indicates that the BP is more volatile than
the USD for a shorter period. However, the situation is just the
opposite in a longer period. This may be explained by the fact
that the USD is on a rising trend while the BP moves tap and down
during the whole period. As a result, the deviations from the
mean of its own sub-period in each sub-period for the USD is less
than that for the BP. If the time period under consideration is
relatively short, the BP may be said to he more volatile than the
100
Fig. 6.1










1979 1980 1981 1982 Time
Note: 1. *and. denote BP and USD, respectively.
2. 1056 observations are hidden.
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Fig. 6.2








Note: 1152 observations are hidden
*denotes spot rates
.denotes three-moth forward rates
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Fig. 6.3












Note: 941 observation are hidden
*denotes spot rates.
.denotes three-month forward rates.
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Table 6.1
Minimum,Maximum, and Enging Values of Transformed Exchange Rates
Currency Type of Rates
Minimum Maximum
Date Value Date Value Ending Vakyea
USD Spot 10/1/79 98.957 24/9/81 128.884 123.278
1-month forward 10/1/79 98.958 24/9/81 128.698 123.045
3-month forward 10/1/79 98.955 24/9/81 128.6987 122,604
6-month forward 5/2/79 97.195 27/9/81 129.273 122,687
BP
spot 5/2/79 97.195 27/1/81 130.263 106.125
1-month forward
1/2/79
97.144 27/1/81 130.358 106.277
3-month forward 1/2/79 96.578 27/1/81 130.563 106.586
6-month forward 1/2/79 96.302 27/1/81 131.782 107.706
Note.a he ending date for the sample is June30, 1982.
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Table 6.2
Summary Statistics for Transformed Spot Rates
Period Currency Mean S.D.a
Nb
3/1/79a- 31/12/79 USD 104.460 2.659 245
2/l/80- 31/12180
BP 109.486 6.671 245
USD 103.843 1.849 247
2/1/81 -31/12/81
BP 119.198 4.496 247
USD 116.693 5.835 247
2/1/82 - 30/6/82
BP 116.048 6.123 247
3/1/79 - 30/6/82
USD 121.598 1.316 120
BP 108.703 2.716 120
USD 110.193 8.022 859
BP 114.056 6.996 859
Note a The standard deviation of the mean
b N.of observations.
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USD D. It should be noted that the exchange rates are. more fluc-
tuant for the year of 1981. This may be partly due to concerning
about the economic uncertainties arising from the recession in
major trading countries, the domestic inflation rate as well as
the visible trade deficit and partly due to the USD highly
volatile in the world market.
Finally, we examine the daily percentage change in spot




where Sit is the spot rate at time t for currency i. Fig. 6.4
and Fig. 6.S present the daily percentage, change in spotes rates of
USD and BP, respectively. Both the USD and. the BP daily percentage
change series seems to fluctuate arouLnd the value of zero. 1t
should be noted that the range between the maximum change and the
minimum change of USD is less than that of B. P. Besides, the
statistical results concerning the daily percentage changes are
shown in Table 6.3. It seems that both the USD and the BP daily
percentage changes in spot rates series are random. All the means
of daily percentage change are not significantly different from
zero even at the 10% level, whether for the entire period or sub-
periods. At the same time, the means of daily percentage change
of USD is greater than t1-hhose of BP for the whole period. However,
the break down of the whole period into four sub-periods reverses
the situation. This result is consistent with the previous








plot of Daily Percentage Change inSpot Rates--USD











Note: 285 observations are hidden.
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107
Fig. 6.5









1979 1980 1981 1982
Time
Note : 207 observation are hidden.
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Table 6.3
Sumary Statistics for Daily Percentage Changes in Spot Rates
Period Currency Mean S.E.a Nb
03/1/79- 31/12/79 USD 0.012 0.025 244
BP 0.4052 0.047 244
02/1/80- 31/12/80 USD 016 0.018 247
BP 0.046 0.037 247
02/1/81- 31/12/81 USD 0.044 0.031 247
BP
-0.044 0.055 247
02/1/82- 30/6/82 USD 0.032 0.036 120
BP
-0.042 0.054 120
02/1/79- 30/6/82 USD 0.025 0.014 858
BP 0.010 0.025 858
Notes: a The standard error of the mean.
b No. of observations
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6. 2 Empirical Results for Forecasting Models
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the three fore-
casting models which are described by equation (2. 16), (2.18) and
(2.19). We would like to restate them here without any mentioning
of their theoretical backup:
(1) The Fisher Parity Model (PPM)
(6. 3)
(2) ri:he Lagged Spot Model (LSM)
(0.4)
and (3) The Forward Rate Model (FRM)
(6.5)
As noted before, the sample for this empirical s Ludy on
exchange rates forecasting models covers the A eriod from January
2, 1980 to February 24, 1.982. 1111ere.are a :otax of 329 daily
observations. This sample period is selected because resutls
from these three models are more cofrpa r able. It is due to the
fact that the FP involves data on interest rates and we cannot
find a set of consistent interest rates data before January, 1980.
Empirically, we are going to analyse one-month, three-monsth and
six-month forecasting horizons which are consistent with the
maturity structure of forward contracts and. interest rates in the
data set. Operationally, we translate the forecasting horizons
to 22, 65 and 130 days since there are about 22, 65 and 130
business working days for one-month, three-monthh and six-month
1 + 1









period, respectively. For instance, one-month ahead forecast pro-
duced by different models at day 1 is compared with spot rate at day
23 the three-month and six-month ahead forecasts are compared with
spot rates at day 66 and 131, respectively. Of course, this opera-
tiornal compromise may increase the magnitude of forecast errors,
especially for the case of one-north forecasting horizon owing to a
large chance for that the one-month ahead for. ecast is not exactly
reconciled with the 22 business working days.
For each forecasting model, we can construct 479 one-month
ahead forecasts, 440 three-month ahead forecasts and 385 six-month
ahead forecasts for the USD and the BP during the sample period.
Finally, before we present the empirical results, it is necessary
for us to define the percentage forecast error, e, as follows:
t
(6.6)
Obviously, a positive (negative) et implies that the forecast
underestimates (overestimates) the future s pot rate. It should
be noted that the subscript of forecast error is time t at which
the forecast is made.
6.2.I Forecasting Performance of Forecasting Models
The performance of the three alternative models is evaluated
Theoretically, we could construct 507 one-month ahead
forecasts, 464 three-month ahead forecasts and 399 six-month
ahead forecasts. However, because of the presence of holiday
during weekdays, the observation of that date would be missing.
Thus, we would loss the two observations of forecasts (errors)--










by means of the Mean Squared Error (MSE) statistic3 which is
defined as
MSE (6.7)
where N is no. of forecasts constructed. The MSS statistic of each
model for the. whole sample period are shown in Ta.ble 6.4. Surpri-
singly, the MSE of the LSM is the lowest among the three models for
every forecasting horizon regardless of currency denomination. This
indicates that the LSM completely outperforms the other two. 1n.
other swords k the LSM which produces the lowest MSE at one forecasting
hciizon also produces the lour, est MSE at other horizons. This implies
that information is integrated across maturity in the market. We may
Call the mode:. horizon hlin(J. wh ch means it works well regardless
of forecasting horizzor. However, the performance of the three fore,--
casting models for the USD is different from that for the BP judging
from Table 6.4. It is because the MSEs are similar across different
models for the USD but the MSEs vary greatly, for the BP forecasting
models. This is supported by the following evidence. The average
ratio of the hi hest MSE to the lowest MSE for the USD is 1.061. On
the contrary, the LSM definitely outperforms the other two for the
BP, This is reflected by the fact that the average ratio of the
highest MSE to the lowest (LSMM) MSF: is 1.274.
Besides, it is interesting that the performance of the FRM
and the FPM is very similar with each other. The average ratio
5 The term 'MSE' used here should be actually called Mean
Percentage Squared Error (MPSE) a The reason why we use MSE instead
of MPSE is that we would like to follow the terminology adopted by
Levich (1979a), who has also utilized this criterion to compare the
performance of different forecasting models for exchange rates





IMSE of the Three Alternative Models: 1980/1 -1982/2
Currency Forecasting Horizon Fisher Parity Zagged Spot Forward Rate Na
USD 1-month 5.5047 5.2954 5.5565 479
3-month 18.8838 18.4160 19.0687 440
6-month 41.9311 38.1486 41.4887 385
BP I-month 7.5477 6.65663 7.6079 479
3-month 26.4109 19.5393 26.5459 440
6-month 72.7696 55.1641 72.8272 385
Note
a denotes no.forecast constructed
denotes the lowest MSE given forecasting horizon.
MSE is in units of percent squared.
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of NSE of the two models is about 1.007. At the same time, the
average ratio of the USD is greater than that for the BP.
Theoretically, these two models are equivalent if the Covered
Interest Rate Parity (CIRP) holds exactly. As noted in Chapter
IV, the CIRP, on the whole, holds true for the BP but not for the
USD. Besides, the. slope coefficient of equat ion (4.1) is close to
one for the USE) although it is significantly different from one
at the 1% level. As a result, the present empirical results are
consistent with the fin dings in Chapter IV. Furthermore, the
FPM outperforms the FRM, and transaction costs or sampling errors
may explain such a small difference.
Mien we break down the whole sample period further into
three sub-periods, the LSM does not necessary outperform the
other two models in all the sub-lperiods. Results are presented
in Table 6.5 and Table 6.6. It is found that the model which is
horizon blind does not necessarily lead to time blind. However,
it is almost time bl:ind for the BP. That is, the LSM outper-
forms the other two models except for the case of six-month
horizon.
On the whole, the empirical results of the forecasting
models are striking. That i, the LSMi outperforms the other two
models for the whole period concerned. Thus, if we want a single
model as a forecasting tool for exchange rates, we should choose
the LSM.
6.2.2 The Nature of Forecasts
Fig. 6.6 mid Fig. 6. 7 display the one-month forecast errors
5A model will produce the lowest VISE regardless of period
of time provided that the model is time blirnd.
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Table 6.5
MSE By Year and Forecasting Horizon -- USD
Period Forecasting Horizon Fisher Parity Lagged Spot Forward Rate N2
SO/1 - 80/12 1-month 2,3958 2,5361 2.4317 214
3-month 5.0508 5.1559 5.1270 174
6-month 7.4839 7.4589 7.0449 117
811/1 - 81/12
1-month 8.2773 7.6953 8.3630 232
3-month 30.0643 29.0153 30.3672 232
6-month 64.7919 58.7068 64.3062 234
82/1- 82/2 1-month 6.1738 6.3165 6.0898 33
3-month 13.3342 13.9514 13.3214
34
6-month 3.1342 2.2683 2.9775 34
Note denotea no. of forecasts construced.
denotes the lowest MSE given year and forecasting horizon.
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Table 6.6
MSE by Year and Forecasting Horizon --BP
Period Forecasting Horizon Fisher Parity Lagged Spot Forward Rate Na
80/1 -80/12 1-month 4.9575 3.9642 5.0925 214
3-month 20.6785 12,1293 20.7968 174
6-month 62.2570 44.2284 63.6014 117
81/1 -81/12 1-month 10.5661 9.6885 10.5865 232
3-month 33.9393 27.3513 34.0403 232
6-month 88,2403 67,9280 87,6673 234
82/1 - 82/2 1-month 3,1252 2.7970 2,9799 33
3-month 4,3775 4.1554 4.8293 34
6-month 2,4700 4.9495 2.4403 34
Note denotes no. of forecasts constructed.
denotes the lowest MSE given year and forecasting horizon.
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(due to the FRM) of USD and BP, respectively.6 The range of
forecast errors for the USD is less than that for the BP.
Besides, forecast errors increase with the length of forecasting
horizon in general. In order to investigate the nature of fore-
cast errors, we need a set of non-over lapping data during the
sample period to avoid serial correlations which may invalidate
our analysis. The non-overlapping sample is randomly selected
from the period concerned. Let us first examine the bi.asedness
of forecasts. Table 6.7 presents the means or forecast errors
of forecasting models. 7 We find that all the means of forecast
errors do not differ significantly form zero even at the 10%
level except for the one-month horizon of the FRM for the USD.
In other words, the three alte-rnative models can produce unbiased
predictors for future spot rates. This indicates that no cu:ar-
rency preference is found between HKD and USD as well as HKD and
BP.9
We now turn to examine the pattern of forecast errors over
time. I lie sample autocorreiation function of forecast errors for
one-month horizon up to 8 Lags and three-month horizon up to 4
lags are shown in Table 6.8. It is found that all the auto-
correlations coefficients are not significantly different from
6 The plots of three-month and six-month horizon forecast
errors over time are presented in Appendix IV.
7 Because of insufficient non--overiapping data, the case for
six-month forecasting horizon will not be examined.
We have shown, on the wholes forward. rates as imbiased
forecasts for future spot rates in Chapter V.
9 In accordance with the Fisherian theory, the foreign
currency is preferrecl when the forecast exchange rate change is
greater than the actual change in exchange rate.
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Fig. 6.6


















Note: 151 observations are hidden.
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Fig. 6. 7
















The Mean of Forecast Errors of Forecasting iodelsa: 1980/1- 1982/2
Currency Forecasting Horizon Fisher Parity Lagged Spot Forward Rate Nb
USD 1-month 0.7391 0.7200 0.7419c10 24
(0.4377) (0.4247) (0.4291)











Note: 1. anon-overlapping data are used.
2. bdenotes no. of observations.
3. c10 denotes that the mean of forecast errors is significantly different from zero at the
10% level.
4. Figures in parentheses are the standard error of the mean of forecast errors.
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zero at the 10% level except for the FRM's one-month forecasting
horizon of the BP. The results are consistent with the findings
of the market efficiency tests in Chapter V. The uncorrelated
forecast errors indicates that even there are forecast errors,
the errors are so random that. they could not be used for predictio
purpose.
Fi.n.ally, Table 6.9 shows that the forecast errors for the
USCG are positive (i. e. forward rates underestimate future spot
rates) in 1980 and 1981 and that for the LAP is positive in 1980
and is negative in 1981. 10 As noted before, the USD followed an
upward trend over the period and the BP moved upward in 1980 and
declined. in 1981. As a. result, there is a tendency that forward
rates underestimate (overestimate) future spot rates when the
spot rate is rising (faiiinlg) 11 '[his is consistent with, the
Modem 'Ilieory of foreig exchange, although we have found that
the forecast errors were not significantly different from zero.
6.2.3 Currency, Forecasting Horizon and Forecasting Performance
The question whether the USD or the BP is easier to be
forecasted is very interesting. Empirically, two alternative
measures are suggested to answer this question. 12 The first
measure is to compare the lowest MSE of the BP with that of the
USD for each forecasting horizon. Such information can be found.
IVWe are not going to discuss the sub-period, January to
February in 1982, because the sub-period is too short to reflect
the trend of the exchange rate series.
11Me result is similar to that of Levich (1979x) and
Kaserman (1973).




Sample Autocorrelation Function of Forecast Errors: 1980/1-1982/2
Forecasting Horizon Model Currency t=1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
1-month laggetl spot USD 0.2740 -0.2513 -0.2503 -0.1371 0.1267 -0.1783 0.0924 0.0045
BP 0.1531 0.1978 0.1971 0.0046 -0.1771 -0.2054 -0.1942 -0.3470
Forward Rate USD 0.3211 -0.2547 -0.2892 -0.1676 0.0748 -0.1695 0.1139 0.1201
BP 0.3983 a10 0.2756 0.2849 0.1273 -0.1614 -0.3310 -0.3408 -0.4479
Fisher Parity USD 0.2956 -0.2420 -0.2815 -0.176 0.1103 -0.1108 0.1375 -0.469
BP 0.2992 0.3133 0.2750 0.0685 -0.1335 -0.2241 -0.2727 -0.4037
3-month Lagged Spot USD -0.2379 -0.2769 -0.2985 -0.4332
BP -0.0113 -0.2229 -0.2378 -0.1886
Forward Rate
USD -0.3269 -0.1943 -0.3426 -4045
BP 0.1571 -0.2071 -0.3405 -0.0231
Fisher Parity
USD -0.2690 -0.2465 -0.3245 -0.4146
BP 0.0576 -0.2324 -0.2986 -0.1243
Note: 310 denotes significant test at the 10% level.
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Table 6.9
The Mean of the Forward Rate Forecast Errors by Year
1980 1981 1982 (up to February)
Currency Me an Na Mean N Mean N
USD 1-month 0.5944 214 0.6793 232 2.2136 33
3-month 1.3087 174 3.1530 2 32 -0.2110 34
6-month 1.9477 117 7.4892 234 0.9127 34
BP 1-month 1.2230 214 -1.3374 232 0.9355 33
3-month 4.0960 174 -3.4916 232 -0.2487 34
6-month 7.7583 117 -5.3899 234 0.0691 34
a
Note: No. of observations.
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in Table 6.4. We find that the USD' s MSE is lower than that of
the BP's at every horizon. The average forecast error (root
mean squared error) is about 2. 3%, 4.3% and 6.2% for the one-
month, three-month and six-month forecasting horizon for the USD,
respectively 2.6'10, 4.4% and 7.4% for the one-month, three-month
and six-month forecasting horizon for the BP. Hence, the USD
could be predicted more easily than the BP. Another measure of
the relative difficulty in forecasting currencies is to count the
percentage of forecasts falling within a band around the future
(realized) spot rates. Table 6.10 displays the percentage of
forecasts falling within a band which is defined as
where k equals 1, 2, 5 or 10 for the BP and the USD. It is dis-
covered that the percentage of forecasts (due to the FRM) falling
into each band for the USD is higher than that for the BP for the
whole period except for the case where k=2 of three-month fore-
casting horizon. In order to investigate the issue more thoroughly,
we break down the whole sample period into three sub-periods in
the light of calendar year. However, the percentage of forecasts
falling into each band of the BP is greater than that of the USD
in 1981 and 1982 (up to February) except for one-month horizon in
1981. The results seem to indicate that the USD is easier to be
forecasted before 1981 and.is more difficult to be forecasted
after 1981 than the BP. As a whole, the USD is easier to be pre-
dicted than the BP. This is consistent with the evidences produced
by the first measure.
Finally, we turn to examine the relation between forecasting
horizon and performance. Theoretically, it is hypothesized that
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Table 6 .10
Percentage of 1-, 3-, and 6-Month Forward Rate Forecasts
within (100±k)% of Future Spot Rate (k=1, 2, 5 and 10)
1980 1981 1982 1980-82 (up to February)
k
fisting
Currency 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0 1.0 2.0 5.0 10.0
USD 42.5 79.0 100.0 100.0 29.3 57.3 89.7 100.0 15.0 39.4 100.0 100.0 34.2 65.8 95.0 100.0
BP 24.3 56.5 99.5 100.0 22.0 45.7 86.6 100.0 54.5 78.8 100.0 100.0 25.3 52.8 93.3 100.0
USD 33.9 53.4 99.4 100.0 0.4 2.6 59.9 98.7 11.8 14.7 88.2 100.0 14.5 23.6 77.7 99.3
BP 8.6 14.9 59.2 100.0 11.2 27.6 62.9 89.7 35.3 64.7 100.0 100.0 12.1 25.5 64.3 94.5
USD 35.0 53.0 96.6 100.0 0.9 3.0 17.1 73.1 50.0 70.6 100.0 100.0 15.6 24.2 48.6 83.6








the MSE is proportionalto forecasting horizon . 13 The theoretical
value of three - month MSE to one - month MSE is 3 six - month MSE to
three - month MSE is 2 . From Table 6 . 11 we can find that all the
ratios are higher than the expected values except for that of
three - monthto one - monthof the LSM of BP . Out of 12 ratios ,
four are close to their expected value . Thus , the empirical
evidence does not support the hypothesis exactly . However , market
forecasts, in the four cases , exhibit a property of time series
forecast which is a forecast with minimum MSE . It is consistent
with EMH that market prices efficiently forecast the future
price .
6 . 3 ConcludingRemarks
During the period in question , both spot rates series of
the USD and the BP shows a wide range of fluctuations. The ratios
of maximumvalue to the minimumvalue of the USD and the BP are
1 . 30 and 1 . 34 , respectively. Besides, the standardeviationof
spot rates of the USD is lower than that of the BP for each
sub - period . Thus , this indicatesthat the series of BP is more
volatile than that of USD for a relatively short period of time .
This is also consistentwith the findings that the USD is easier
to be predictedthan the BP . 14 On the whole , the USD shows an
upward . trend while the BP exhibits an up and down trend over time .
With regard to the performanceof the three alternative
13 The hypothesisarises from that the variance of the fore -
cast error is proportionalto forecastinghorizon . , which is a
relationship between forecasting accuracy and forecasting horizon
derived from time series methods .
14 In fact , the forecastinghorizon is relatively short , that
is , one month , three month and six month .
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Table6 . 11
MSE Ratio between Two Forecasting Horizons
Currency Ratios Fisher Parity Lagged Spot Forward Rate
USD 3 : 1 3 . 43 3 . 48 3 . 43
6 : 3 2 . 22 2 . 07 2 . 18
BP 3 : 1 2 . 45 2 . 94 3 . 49
6 : 1 2 . 76 2 . 82 2 . 74
Note : a 3 : 1 and 6 : 1 denotesthe ratio of 3 - monthMSE to 1 - monthMSE and the ratio of 6 - monthMSE to
3 - month MSE , respectively.
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forecastingmodels , the LSM outperformsthe other two models .
This may reflects that the markets , namely , the spot market , the
forward market and the money market , do not integrate completely. l 5
Besides , the three models produce unbiased predictors for
future spot rates . This may imply that there exists no currency
preference during the period in question . More importantly,
forecast errors do not display any serial correlation . It seems
that we cannot construct forecasts , which are better than the
best market forecasts , for future spot rates . Since the forecast
errors of the three models are almost perfectly correlated , a
compositeforecastlike equation( 2 . 17 ) is useless. This is , of
course , consistent with the efficient market hypothesis . Although
we have found that the market is weak - form inefficientin Chapter
V when daily or one - month data are used , the informationcarried
by the residual terms is too little to make profit . It follows
from our present and previous findings that we may conclude that
the market is efficient in the practical point of view . This may
imply that no sophisticated exchange rate forecasting services
institution can provide better forecast than the market . In other
words , propositionthree cannot be rejected . And , the best
market forecast is the current spot rate which everyone can get .
15 In fact , although these markets do not integrate perfectly ,
they do reflect almost the same set of information. It may be
supported by the fact that the forecast errors among the three
models is almost perfectly correlated. To take an example , for
one - month forecastinghorizon of the USD , the correlationbetween
forecasterrors of the FPM and that of the LSM is 0 . 9974 between





ibis study mainly investigatedthe behavior of the Hong
Kong foreign exchange( FX ) market . The main hypothesisn this
thesis is that the Hong Kong FX market is efficient . More
specifically , we concentratedon testing the following proposi -
tions : ( 1 ) the market environmentis consistentwith the
EfficientMarket Hypothesis( ENH ) , ( 2 ) the behaviorof market
participants ( interest arbitragers and speculators ) is consistent
with the EMH , and ( 3 ) market prices fully reflect all available
informationfor the market . In fact , the purpose of this chapter
is to make some concludingremarks on the findings in previous
chapters.
First , we would like to give a brief summaryon our findings.
In Chapter III , the institutional framework was presented based
on materials obtained from interviews with five leading banks
and one broker firm . We found that the size of the market was ,
more or less , equal to that of Singapore. The market turnover was
about US $ 10 billion for a moderateactive working day in 1982 .
With regard to market participants, about one hundred banks and
DTCs were active in the market . The most active participantswere
Citibank , Hong Kong Bank , Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New
York , Bank of Tokyo , Bank of China , Swiss Bank Corporation,
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Bankers Trust Company, Bank of America , Hang Seng Bank , Chase
Manhattan Bank , Midland Bank , Jardine Fleming and Wardley Limited
The relative activity of each of the market participants varies
with different currencies. There was a tendency for banks to
trade actively in its parent - country ' s currency. In terms of
market share , DeutscheMark ( DM ) , JapaneseY n ( JY ) , Hong Kong
Dollar ( HKD ) , BritishPound( BP ) and Swiss Franc ( SF ) were the
most active trading currencies . In addition , DTCs concentrated
their activitiesin the T . T . market and their operationswere
more speculativeand aggressive than banks , Basically , the
market worked very well . All relevant information was available
in the market and flowed very smoothly . This indicated that the
market appeared to work efficiently . Hence , propositionone
cannot be rejected .
In Chapter IV , we found that the Covered Interest Rate
Parity ( CIRP ) hypothesiswas rejected for the USD in all cases
and was unable to be rejected for the BP except for the six - month
maturity case . The acceptanceof CIRP hypothesisfor the BP
means that there is not any unexploitedprofit opportunity. The
failure of the CIRP hypothesisfor the USD seems to indicate
the presence of unexploited profit opportunities. However , these
unexploited profit opportunities, which may be accounted by some
left - out explanatoryvariables, do not exist . As noted before ,
one probable reason to account for the failure of the CIRP is the
limited arbitrage funds of HKD . This may be viewed as the
imperfectionof the market . However , it is still consistent
with the EMH , since the market imperfectionis a necessarybut
not a sufficientconditionfor the rejection of the ENH . In fact ,
130
the market is efficient in the sense that market prices reflect
all available information. Hence , as a whole , we cannot reject
propositiontwo . However , the failure of the CIRP for the USD
may exhibit that the Modern Theory of forward exchange rate
determinationmay be a more valid hypothesis to describe the
behaviorof the T . T . market.
The market efficiency tests were conducted in Chapter V .
On the one hand , the EM was rejectedin the weak - form sense
when daily or one - month data were used for testing . On the other
hand , the EMH could not be rejectedwhen two - month or three - month
data were used . Although the autocorrelationcoefficients were
significantlydifferent from zero in the cases in which daily or
one - month data were used , they were small enough to be negligible.
This is consistentwith propositionthree . Therefore , the state -
ment that the market is efficient is a good approximationo
depict the real world . In addition , we also found that forward
rates were unbiased predictorsfor future spot rates as a whole .
It was found that , in Chapter VI , both the exchangerates
for the USD and the BP fluctuatedwidely during the sample
period . Besides , the exchangerate for the BP was more volatile
than that for the USD . This was consistentwith the later
finding that the prediction for the USD was easier than that
for the BP . With regard to the performanceof the three fore -
castingmodels- - the Lagged- Spot Model ( LSM ) , the ForwardRate
Model ( FRM ) and the Fisher Parity Model ( FPM ) , the LSM out -
performed the other two models . Furthermore, these three models
were able to produce unbiased forecasts for future spot rates .
What is more important is that the forecast errors are serially
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uncorrelated. This implied that forecast errors could not be
predicted which is consistent with proposition three . It should
be noted that a composite forecast constructed by forecasts
produced by these three forecasting models would not reduced the
mean squared error to a significant extent because of the almost
perfectly correlated forecast errors among the three models .
On the whole , we may come to a conclusion, from a brief
review on our previous findings , that the hypothesisthat the Hong
Kong FX market is efficient cannot be rejected for the sample
period . This assertion may be supportedby the fact that the
three specific propositions cannot be rejected .
With the efficient market for foreign exchange , there are
implications for investors and portfolio managers . Obviously ,
forecasts for future spot rates are crucial to their decision -
making . In Chapter VI , we have found that market prices could
be used to construct unbiased and consistent forecasts . These
forecasts are available in the market and anyone can get them
without any significantcosts . At . the same time , under the EMH
context , no investors and portfolio managers can earn extra profit
by subscription of outside forecasting services for foreign
exchange or by sophisticatedanalysis of available data . In
addition , if a single model is selected to be a forecastingtool ,
the LSM should be chosen .
Another implication concerned about the hedging strategy
( hedgingor not hedgingof exchangerisks ) of a firm ( investor)
provided that the firm ( investor ) holds an asset denominatedin
foreign currency . From our previous findings , although the
forward rates are unbiased predictors for future spot rates ,
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these forecasts seem imprecise . It is because the average fore -
cast errors in terms of root mean squarederror are about 2 . 4 % ,
4 . 4 % and 6 . 4 % for the one - month, the three- monthand the six -
monthahead forecastwith respecto the USD 2 . 8 % , 5 . 2 % and
8 . 5 % for the one - month, the three - monthand the six - monthahead
forecastwith respect to the BP . As a result , the firm may
experience moderate uncertainty about the future spot rate by
means of market forecasts. At the same time , no one can obtain
forecasts better than the market forecasts because the market is
efficient . Thus , the firm ' s hedging strategy will influence its
long - term expected profit . In other words , continuedhedging of
the exchange risk exposure will reduce the volatility of earnings .
As a result , if the firm ( investor ) prefers a lower volatility
of earnings , the continued hedging is necessary. Otherwise, the
firm would result in a great variation of income .
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AppendixI
The Schedule of Interview and Interviewees
Name of Interviewee Date
Allied ExchangeLtd . March9 , 1983
Bank of America Feb . 9 , 1983
Citibank, N . A . Jan . 26 , 1983
Hang Seng Bank Ltd . Jan . 19 , 1983
Hong Kong and Shanghai April 20 , 1983
Banking Corporation




1 . What are the relationshipsamong banks , brokers , traders and
corporations? Is there any difference between a small trader
and a large corporationin accessing the FX market , especially
in the quotationsof the exchangerate ?
2 . Will all informationabout the market be known by the market
participants? How about the process of the informationflow
concerningexchangerates quotations, e . g . a direct call
between two banks ? Will this informationbe known by other
market participants ?
3 . Do participantswho locate in foreign countries ( banks and
corporations) , trade in the Hong Kong FX market , and to what
extent ? Through what channel , do they join the Hong Kong FX
market.
4 . What is the size of the daily turnoverin the FX market of
Hong Kong ? How about that of Singapore?
5 . How do you rank the followingcurrenciesin terms of transac .
tion volume : Swiss Franc , Pound Sterling , JapaneseYen and
Deutsche Mark ? Please roughly estimate their respective
transaction volume or the porportionsamong them in the Hong
Kong market ?
6 . What factors , if you are a market maker , will be considered
so as to make a quotation, and the size of the spread in you
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quotation?
7 . With regard to your bank , what is the ratio of volume
transactedin the FX market between a direct deal and an
indirect deal ? What are the advantages and disadvantages
of a direct deal and an indirect deal ?
8 . Is the swap market in Hong Kong active ? What interest rates
are used in the calculationof swap points ?
9 . Explain the delivery mechanismafter a FX dealing contract
has been made ?
10 . As we know , the brokeragef e of the Hong Kong market is the
highest in the world , why ? How do you comparethe quality
of the broker ' s services, with that of the rest of the world ?
11 , How many FX dealers are there in Hong Kong ?
12 . What is the organisationstructureof a dealing team in a
bank?
13 . What are the favorablefactors which help Hong Kong to be an
internationalFX market as well as an financial centre ? Are
there any problemsin the Hong Kong FX market ?
14 . Which role does the Hong Kong FX market play in the globle
FX market ? What is the importanceof the Hong Kong market
to other markets such as Frankfurt, Zurich , London , New York
and San Francisco?
15 . I s there any other FX marketsin which the Hong Kong dollar
is trade other than Hong Kong ? Are they active ?
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16 . Is there any relationshipbetween the gold price and the
USD?
17 . Many people use Moving Average to forecast the US dollar
exchangerate . In your opinion , is it a useful tool for
forecasting? What are the effective tools for forecasting?
18 . At present, what do you think about the trend of T . T . rate
in long term and in short term ? What are the important
factorswhich affect the T . T . rate ?
19 . How long is the dealers ' forecastinghorizon ?
20 . What is the relationshipbetween the HKAB and the HKFXDBA:
21 . Is there any regulationsimposedby the HKAB on bank ' s FX
dealing industry ?




Data used in our study mainly come from two sources , namely ,
the South China Morning Post and Hang Seng Bank Limited , Data on
spot and forward exchange selling and buying prices as well as
interest rates for U . S . dollar and British pound are picked up
from the South China Morning Post . It is noted that the interest
rates for U . S . dollar and British pound are bid rate of Eurodollar
deposits quoted at Hong Kong . For data on interest rates for
Hong Kong dollar , which are inter - bank closing rates , are supplied
by Hang Seng Bank Limited , All data are collected for each
business working day during Monday to Fri day . The exchange rates
data are collectedfrom January3 , 1979 to June 30 , 1982 . Since
data on interest rates for Hong Kong dollar can only be collected
starting from January 2 , 1980 , in addition to data consistency,
the sample period for all interest rates are from January 2 , 1980
to February24 , 1982 . The required data in the South China
Morning Post are not available for a few days during the sample
period . There are 11 , 37 , and 39 missingvalues for data on
exchange rates , interest rates of US dollar and British pound ,
respectively. We shall cope with the missing values as follows .
First , let us describe the method to handle missing values for
exchange rates . Suppose the observationof day t misses . Thus
the averageof exchangerates of day t - 1 and day t + l is used as
a proxy for day t . For interest rates , we use Eurodollardeposits
rate quoted at the Asian Wall Street Journal as a proxy for the
missing value .
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Owing to data on the exchange rates having selling and
buying prices , we use the averageof the two prices ( mid - point
price ) for all the empirical works throughouthe study . Finally
the sample periods for Chapter IV to Chapter VI are as follows :
Chapter Sanple Period No . of Observations
IV January2 , 19 80 to 529
February24 , 1982
V January3 , 1979 to 859
June 30 , 1982
VI Both the periods for 529 / 859
ChapterIV and V are
used
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Fig. A 4 . 1
Plot of Forward Rate Forecast Errors for Three - month ForecastingHorizon - - USD
Note : 183 observationsare hidden .
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Fig. A 4 . 2
Plot of Forward Rate Forecast Errors for Six - month ForecastingHorizon - - USD




Fig. A 4 . 3
Plot of Forward Rate Forecast Errors for Three - month ForecastingHorizon - - BP
Note : 121 observationsare hidden .
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Appendix IV
Fig. A 4 . 4
Plot of Forward Rate Forecast Errors for Six - month ForecastingHorizon - - BP
Note : 136 obserbationsare hidden .
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